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ABSTRACT 
 
KADER, SARAH New Refugees – Old Rules: An Analysis of Jordanian Refugee 
Policies. Department of Political Science, March 2016 
 
ADVISOR: Thomas Lobe  
 
 Over 1.4 million Syrians have fled to Jordan since 2011 as a result of the brutal, 
ongoing conflict in Syria. Just as the Palestinians fled Israel these last 67 years, the newly 
arrived Syrian refugees are an ignored actor in a cruel game between the Jordanian state, 
the United Nations Agencies, the United States and interested non-state actors. The 
resulting human rights violations, including denial of rights to work, healthcare, 
education, and movement, are not accidental but are sanctioned by the Jordanian state.  
This thesis analyzes Jordan’s history with the Palestinian refugees; the 
motivations and implementation of policies excluding Palestinians from integrating into 
Jordanian society, and compares these policies Jordan’s current decisions regarding the 
treatment of Syrian refugees. Through research of Jordanian ministries such as the 
Ministries of Interior, Education, and Health, and data provided by the United Nations 
Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) and the United Nations High Commission on 
Refugees (UNHCR) we find that the exclusive policies which affected the Palestinians 
are the template which the Kingdom of Jordan will use to deny Syrians the services and 
care they desperately need.
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Introduction 
 It is impossible to understand the intricacies of the Syrian Refugee crisis: the 
decisions countries make in how to care for refugees, and the international institutions 
that come to their aid, without first understanding the events behind the creations of these 
institutions. Taking into consideration the environment surrounding the creation of 
accords, statutes and institutions, we can further understand the few “options” afforded to 
refugees as they attempt to navigate their new, insecure worlds post displacement.   
 A refugee is defined as a person fleeing armed conflict or persecution1.  Refugee 
crises and the attempted management of them have been studied since the beginning of 
World War II. Since the flight of any group en masse is typically precipitated by conflict, 
the political turmoil – war, revolution, genocide, or endemic gang violence – that caused 
a group to abandon their homes and livelihoods is an important topic of scholarly and 
public policy based scrutiny. Not only are the causes of a refugee exodus analyzed, but 
the corresponding effects of refugee migration on neighboring countries, the international 
community and the subsequent decisions that are made regarding those refugee groups is 
deeply studied. Crisis after crisis, the aftermath of flight is studied in order to determine 
how to better care for refugees who remain stateless, and how to better respond when the 
next event occurs.  
                                                   
1 Barnett, M. (2001). Humanitarianism with a Sovereign Face: UNHCR in the Global Undertow.  
 International Migration Review, 35(1), 244–277. Retrieved from  
 http://www.jstor.org/stable/2676060 
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 Each group of refugees provides a different lesson; Vietnamese refugees were 
resettled and repatriated. Most Rwandan refugees returned home. Though the endings are 
different, the ultimate trend determining how refugees will live the course of their lives is 
influenced by two general actors: the bordering nations to a country in conflict, and the 
international community, which together scrounges resources to bring some modicum of 
support to the refugee community.  
 Refugees are in the unique position of statelessness, and are dependent on 
neighboring nations to provide shelter and other basic necessities crucial to survival. 
Neighboring countries usually lack the resources or infrastructural capacity to 
accommodate a large number of refugees, or are preoccupied with caring for their own, 
often poor populations. As a result, the host nations and refugees have to rely on the 
good-will of the international community for financial support.  The fate of these large 
groups of people largely depends on the decisions made by these two sets of actors.  
Volleying between these two actors are the various organizations and do-gooders, both 
international governmental organizations such as UNICEF and the World Health 
Organization and non-governmental organizations like the International Red Cross 
Association.  
 However, a refugee, the stateless human, is still human, and as such their rights 
are recognized, at least theoretically, within the international community. One important 
document which details these rights is the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of the 
Refugee, which was first approved by the United Nations in 1951. Though initially 
prepared to defend the rights of the European refugees displaced by WWII, it branched 
out to cover all refugees, no matter their origin, with one important exception. The 
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Convention places a specific amount of duties on its signees, which, alongside the 1951 
Conventions definition of a refugee, has produced some reluctance on behalf of 
numerous nations, some of which, like Jordan, have never signed it outright. The 
signatories of the 1951 convention agree to  cooperate with the United Nations High 
Commission on Refugees (UNHCR) which coordinates and provides humanitarian 
assistance to almost every single group of refugees that has existed since 1951, as well as 
the implementation of  national legislation to insure applications of the convention2. The 
1951 Refugee Convention denotes important rights that refugees have, such as the right 
to seek asylum, or the right against refoulment, which makes it illegal for a country to 
send an asylum seeker back to the dangerous place they have left. By refusing to sign it, 
many countries refuse to hold themselves accountable to the international community for 
treating refugees inhumanely.  
 The 1951 Refugee convention also highlights the responsibility of the UNHCR, 
the satellite organization of the U.N. responsible for the funding, provision, and 
coordination of refugee relief services, and the international community to realize 
“durable solutions” on behalf of a group of refugees. The UNHCR notes three 
“permanent solutions” for a refugees’ insecure position. The first, repatriation, is defined 
as the voluntary return to the “home country” or the  “country of origin”3.  In this case, 
the status of refugee is temporary and the refugee regains citizenship (and ideally) rights 
within their nation of origin.  Voluntary repatriation, when a refugee returns to their home 
nation when it is safe to do so , and of their own free will, is considered the “ideal” 
                                                   
2  UNHCR: States Parties to the Convention and Protocol, retrieved 1 29 2016  
3 Voluntary Repatriation. (n.d.). Retrieved November 10, 2015. 
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solution by the UNHCR4. The UNHCR assists with negotiation between host nations and 
the nation of origin to determine whether or not repatriation is possible.  
Repatriation is further classified within the context of the conflict from which a 
refugee has fled and under which they have returned. These circumstances should be 
viewed on a spectrum which can classify types of repatriation with great variability. 
Examples of these factors include: whether the repatriation is unassisted or organized, 
and by which actors; the degree to which it is purely voluntary, encouraged, induced, or 
forced; whether it is a return by an individual, a small group, or a more sizeable 
collective; whether, and to what extent, there has been a significant change in the original 
cause of flight. 5   
A common thread amongst all groups of displaced peoples, from Eastern Europe, 
to Sudan to Vietnam, is the desire to return home, and this is why repatriation is 
considered the ideal solution. Though repatriation is considered the most desirable in 
abstract, “it is the most difficult to achieve in the concrete”6. Refugee literature cites 
many failed attempts by the UNHCR to organize voluntary repatriation, from repatriation 
attempts in former Yugoslavia, Eastern Africa, and other parts of the world7.   Issues 
surrounding repatriation include constructs of nationalism, the economic realities of 
returning to a war torn state, which can be just as difficult as living as a refugee. Silent 
                                                   
4 UNHCR Global Report 2013 - Finding durable solutions. (n.d.). Retrieved November 10, 2015, from 
http://www.unhcr.org/539809d8e.html  
5 Stein, B., & Cuny, F. (n.d.). Refugee repatriation during conflict: Protection and post-return 
assistance. Development in Practice, 173-187.  
6 Zeager, L., & Bascom, J. (1996). Strategic Behavior in Refugee Repatriation: A Game-Theoretic 
Analysis. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 460-485.   
7 Waters, T. (2001) Bureaucratizing the Good Samaritan: The Limitations of Humanitarian Relief 
Operations.  
  
 
5 
deterrents to repatriation can come within the refugee, the inability to return to towns 
where loved ones were lost, with traumatic memories  
Analysts cite the economic inability of the nation of origin, insufficient donor 
activity and long term instability as core deterrents to successful organized voluntary 
repatriation8. Successful, organized repatriation requires the cooperation of both the host 
nation and nation of origin, as well as sufficient funding, without which keeping each 
party accountable for the welfare of the population becomes much more difficult9.  
Furthermore, reintegration into the nation of origin and regaining financial stability make 
repatriation a long and difficult process.   
 The repatriation of refugees from Sierra Leone following the civil war which 
ranged from 1991 to 2002 is a prime example of many difficulties associated with 
repatriation, even when voluntary. An estimated 400,000 Sierra Leonean refugees fled 
into the neighboring nations of Guinea and Liberia during more than ten years of 
violence, with an estimated two million internally displaced. After the conclusion of the 
civil war, the UNHCR began an assisted repatriation program. This program, which 
conveyed almost 200,000 refugees by the end of 2004, provided them for transportation, 
four months of rations and a few essential items such as a tent, was successful in 
returning refugees to Sierra Leone but widely unsuccessful in reintegrating refugees back 
into the country, for reasons including widespread poverty, as well sociopsychological 
                                                   
8Stein, B. (n.d.). Durable Solutions for Developing Country Refugees. International Migration 
Review, 264-264.  
9 Long, K. (2013). The Ethics of Voluntary Repatriation. Refugees, Rights, and Repatriation The Point 
of No Return, 157-177.  
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reasons10 such as lack of attachment to Sierra Leone after living so long in another 
country.  
Though refugees always keep home in mind, home may not be a safe place to 
return to. Forced repatriation can occur due to systematic oppression by the host nation, 
including violence against the refugees from host citizens. Host countries ultimately have 
an interest in the repatriation of refugees, voluntary or not, and some host nations will 
expel refugees from camps and local communities and return them to their country of 
origin. This process was noticed in its largest scale in Tanzania and the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo, where troops militantly forced 1.4 million refugees back to 
Rwanda. This process of “forced repatriation”, or refoulment, is considered an 
international crime underneath the 1951 Convention on the Status of Refugees.  
The second “durable” solution is the transfer and resettlement of countries from 
the developing host nation to a third country, perhaps a country with more financial 
resources to accommodate them. Resettlement as a viable option requires the other 
nations to allow for a large influx of refugees into their nation. The UNHCR and, by 
extension, the United Nations, has named resettlement “the costliest and least desirable 
solution” to any refugee crisis, despite the fact that it is a more permanent solution than 
repatriation, especially in countries with recurring conflict. While repatriation is ideal 
because refugees can return to their homes, and that the violence is over; resettlement 
programs are the international communities acknowledgement that for some refugees, 
returning home can never happen.  
                                                   
10 BRADLEY, M. (2014). Rethinking refugeehood: Statelessness, repatriation, and refugee 
agency. Review of International Studies, 40(1), 101-123. 
doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0260210512000514 
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Though resettlement may be the costliest durable solution, it is the most 
economically sound solution especially in places of long-standing, recurrent conflict.  
Due to the participation of wealthier nations, resettlement also serves as a form of 
reparation for those who have suffered so much. The massive resettlement of Vietnamese 
refugees in the United States and France following the Vietnam War is an example of this 
kind of success.  Following the Vietnam war, the hundreds of South Vietnamese 
attempting to flee with evacuating US military personnel gave many Americans a better 
idea of what the massive losses the Vietnamese had experienced in the war. The former 
President Gerald Ford pushed The Indochina Migration and Refugee Act through 
Congress against popular opinion, appealing to the American public’s sense of 
responsibility. The Indochina Migration and Refugee Act allotted a budget for 
resettlement services, including healthcare and education, even in the face of recurring 
arguments against refugee settlement, including domestic poverty and questions 
regarding a group’s ability to integrate into the host society.  
Typical nativist arguments were often exacerbated by scale, over 130,000 
refugees were successfully resettled in the United States and caused concerns with 
resettlement, such as the the worsening of existing poverty in the United States at the 
time, or the difficulties refugees will face assimilating into their new culture. Despite 
these misgivings,  the resettlement of about  Vietnamese refugees and the resulting 
remittances those families sent to Vietnam is historically considered a success 11. 
 So when neither of these two durable solutions, resettlement or repatriation, are 
possibilities, the last durable solution is known as local integration. Local integration, 
                                                   
11 Tempo, Carl (2008). Americans at the Gate: The United States and Refugees during the Cold War. 
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when done properly is the integration of the refugees into political, economic, and social 
fabric of their host nation, typically a neighboring country. The host nation is typically 
bears the load of the refugee population. However, the local “integration” of refugees 
implies that these people may regain some aspects of normalcy in a new place, 
employment, the right to property, and services such as education and healthcare.  
 Local integration, true integration where a refugee can begin a new life as a 
productive citizen, rarely happens in the poor, developing nations where local integration 
is most likely to take place. More likely, the host nation will allow for other international 
agencies to manage or contain the refugees, to keep them alive but far, far away from the 
possibility of becoming a permanent member of a society. It is in these countless refugee 
crises, Afghani, Sudanese, Guatemalan, and countless others, that one can recall the sea 
of UNHCR stamped tents, surrounded by barbed wire fences. Containment is the most 
temporary, cruelest, and most common way the world responds to a refugee crisis. 
Without the freedom to move or work, refugee camps are simply glorified internment 
camps.  
 To predict the possibility of a bordering host nation’s decision to integrate versus 
contain a refugee population, one must take into account the “political will, diplomacy, 
and statesmanship of [host] governments”, and the extent to which a country provides 
education, healthcare and the opportunity to work to refugees; services important to the 
concept of integration. This case study refers to two specific refugee populations, 
Palestinian and Syrian, within the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, a country burdened 
with a continuous influx of refugees since 1948.  
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In order to highlight the inconsistency with which the international community 
responds to a group’s collective displacement, for example, why Palestinians were never 
given the right to repatriate, a massive resettlement campaign, or successful integration 
into a host nation like Jordan, we must make a historical comparison to a refugee group 
fleeing conflict at the same time. Following World War II, 60 million, 12 displaced 
laborers, survivors from conflict zones, and political refugees fled from the Soviet zone 
to Western Europe.  Almost concurrently, across the Mediterranean, Palestinians were 
fleeing their ancestral homes towards the West Bank, Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria. 
Despite the large volume and need of both groups, the way the international community 
regarded these two refugee groups in terms of providing security and assistance provides 
a lesson for the lack of assistance afforded many groups of refugees today.  
The sense of responsibility attached to the victims of WWII and the early stages 
of the Cold War, the majority of whom were European was much greater than the 
responsibility the Western world felt for the Palestinian Arabs displaced after the creation 
of the state of Israel. As a result, the institutions and rights afforded to these groups 
reflected this varying sense of responsibility. For example, The United Nations Relief and 
Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA), founded in 1943, then the International 
Refugee Organization (IRO), which took over the duties of the UNRRA in 194613, were 
both temporary and Eurocentric in nature. Their mandates were temporary, their focus 
solely on the repatriation and resettlement of European refugees. The limited time-span 
of these institutional mandates is even reflected in the UNHCR, which is a permanent 
                                                   
12  Harris, C., & Wulker, G. (1953). The Refugee Problem of Germany. Economic Geography, 10-10. 
13 AGREEMENT FOR UNRRA. (n.d.). Retrieved January 9, 2016, from  
http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/policy/1943/431109a.html  
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body of the United Nations but still treats each refugee crisis as temporary, leading to 
inconsistencies in humanitarian aid which have important consequences, like disruptions 
in a refugee’s access to food, water, and healthcare.  
 The United Nations High Commission on Refugees mandate is to “provide, on a 
non-political and humanitarian basis, international protection to refugees and to seek 
permanent solutions for them”14. The culmination in United Nations actions regarding the 
European refugee crisis came in 1951, as six million refugees remained unsettled. Despite 
a common agreement to protect the status of refugees, each refugee crisis is a complex 
arrangement of international agencies, and the political agendas of powerful nations. The 
“permanent solution” a refugee needs may provide refugees with safety, but above all 
must suit the political interests of the world’s powerful nations at the time.  that may help 
the refugees but above all suits. The refugees who should be given the agency to decide 
how they rebuild their lives, are an ignored pawn in a global game.   
Though post World War II, Europeans fleeing to Western Europe had the 
assistance of donors and the goodwill of western governments when fleeing to safety. 
This was evident in the legitimization of their “refugee passports” as forms of 
identification, and entrance (though limited) into the Western European economies. This 
rarely occurred within other developing host nations, which are much more economically 
burdened by the refugee’s presence and do not have the infrastructure to support them. In 
these cases, “local integration” at best means unofficial employment and some access to 
services that international actors, such as UN organizations or NGOs, provides. The 1951 
                                                   
14 UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Self-Study Module 1: An Introduction to 
International Protection. Protecting Persons of Concern to UNHCR, 1 August 2005, available at: 
http://www.refworld.org/docid/4214cb4f2.html [accessed 10 January 2016] 
  
 
11 
Geneva Convention on the Status of the Refugee also guaranteed refugees political rights, 
particularly, against refoulment – a state sanctioned deportation of a refugee to their 
unsafe nation of origin.  
 Following 1950, refugee populations have had the support of the UNHCR, who 
would negotiate with host nations, origin nations, service providing NGOs and possible 
resettlement countries on its behalf. The singular exception to the UNHCR’s mandate is 
the majority population of Palestinian refugees. The 1951 Convention on the Status of the 
Refugee specifically excludes any group of displaced peoples receiving assistance from 
any agency apart from the UNHCR15. The Palestinians in the host nations of Jordan, 
Lebanon and Syria fall under the mandate of the United Nations Relief and Works 
Agency, a UN body commissioned to provide direct relief to Palestinians within these 
host nations.  
 As I will show in the upcoming chapters of this thesis, the United Nations Relief 
and Works Agency (UNRWA) allowed the international community to disengage from 
protecting the Palestinians’ political rights. Since UNRWA already provided services 
(food and shelter) for Palestinians, Palestinians were excluded from benefiting from any 
other U.N. refugee agency. The 750,000 Palestinian refugees that fled into Syria, 
Lebanon, and Jordan in 1948 received no political protection, and while a small minority 
were able to find resettlement in a western country, the majority Palestinian refugee never 
found a “permanent solution” to their plight. The exclusion of Palestinians from the 
Convention on the Status of Refugees places millions of Palestinians in the position of 
                                                   
15 Palestinians Who Fall Under the 1951 Convention. (n.d.). Retrieved November 11, 2015, from 
http://www.refugeelegalaidinformation.org/palestinians-who-fall-under-1951-convention  
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“permanent temporariness”16. Repatriation was ruled out almost automatically during any 
discussion of peace between Israel and Palestine.  The “right to return” was solely for 
Jews migrating into Israel, not Palestinians wanting to return to their farmland. While 
resettlement and integrations were viable, if not the most desirable options, even those 
were denied to Palestinians within their Arab host nations. The result of this is a 
paradoxical “permanent temporary status” spanning generations, where both refugees and 
their descendants are disenfranchised, dependent on IGOs and NGOs for their survival, 
and in constant insecurity.  
 In this state of “permanent temporary status”, the host nation plays a much larger 
role in the security and well – being of the refugee population. The way each nation 
addresses a large influx of refugees can be determined by a combination of internal 
political motivators and external pressures. The combination of these two variables can 
lead to wildly shifting policies regarding the integration or exclusion of refugees within 
the host nation, and contributes to the refugee population’s sense of insecurity.  
 This variability in policies also affects their access to services such as education, 
healthcare and safe living conditions. Without consistent living space and protection, 
many children in refugee camps must rely on informal educational services provided by a 
third actor (an NGO, or IGO), and depending on the inconsistency of funding and length 
of their refugee status, may go without education for years17. This is especially true in 
emergency camp settings, where education is deprioritized in favor of funding basic 
forms of aid (food and shelter). Access to quality healthcare within refugee camps is 
                                                   
16 Menachem Klein, 'The Palestinian refugees of 1948: models of allowed and denied return,' in 
Dumper, 2006 pp. 87–106, p. 93. 
17 Refugees in Camps. (2014). Refugee Politics in the Middle East and North Africa.  
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precarious at best, and absent at worst. Health outcomes are consistently poor due to the 
lack of management of chronic conditions, but access to healthcare is incredibly 
dependent on the refugee’s integration into the host society.  
 The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, was the first Arab country to host and 
partially resettle Palestinian refugees.   In the past four years Jordan has been 
overwhelmed with several hundred thousand Syrian refugees seeking refuge. In order for 
third party actors, such as small relief non-governmental organizations (NGOS) to 
provide help to people who desperately need it, it is crucial to understand the various 
actors, their interests and roles within Jordan’s political landscape. It is just as important 
to understand the geopolitical landscape at the time of migration, and how actors such as 
the United States and United Nations, play a role in Jordanian policymaking.  
The plight of the Palestinian refugees, now more than seventy years in the 
making, then offers a base with which to analyze how Syrians, a relatively new refugee 
population, have been treated thus far, especially in regards to healthcare services. By 
understanding the policy shifts over the initial twenty-year period in terms of actors, not 
only is it possible to understand how the policies have shifted in a more exclusive 
direction, but more pointedly, why so many gaps in care exist., and why it is difficult for 
so many innocent people have difficulties finding the services they to which they have an 
undeniable right. 
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History of the Palestinian Refugee Crisis: 1948-1950 
 
 As stated in the introduction, the treatment of Palestinian refugees remains 
different than  the treatment of any other refugee group to this day. The responsibility for 
the Palestinian exodus; a pouring of more than 750,000 Palestinians from coast cities 
such as Haifa and Jaffa into neighboring Lebanon, Syria, and Jordan, was unwanted by 
Syria, Lebanon and the rest of the international community18. The exodus caused by the 
1948 Arab Israeli War was violent; the displacement accompanied by the forceful 
eviction of Palestinians from their homes, miles – long marches, and massacres. It was 
also an expulsion that seemed a long-time coming, with members of the international 
community, the United Kingdom in particular, complicit in denying Palestinians their 
right to self-determination, and following the crisis, in denying their political rights as 
refugees.   
 However, the aftermath of the refugee crisis and the singular lack of protection 
afforded to Palestinian refugee crisis is more unique than the circumstances of their 
exodus. This is largely due to intense Israeli protection over their new territory and 
complacency on behalf of the International Community. The refugees, which had fled for 
their own safety under violence or the threat of it, were eager to return to their homes. 
The majority of the refugees that attempted to wanted to search for their loved ones, or to 
                                                   
18 Palestine refugees | UNRWA. (n.d.). Retrieved March 06, 2016, from 
http://www.unrwa.org/palestine-refugees  
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reclaim their homes or harvest their fields19. Normally, the “right to return” to a refugees 
place of origin is a political right granted to every refugee group. The 1951 Geneva 
Convention on the Status of the Refugee, states that “Each refugee is authorized to return 
to their home state from the contracting [host] state”20.  
 There was never any execution of this convention after the Palestinian refugee 
crisis, because two parties made the repatriation of Palestinians actively impossible, the 
Israelis, and the International community. Though Palestinians had a right to return to 
their homes after the 1948 Arab Israeli War ended according to the 1951 Geneva 
Convention, Palestinians were either deported back over the Israeli border, or shot at by 
Israeli military forces21. In 1954, the Israeli Knesset would pass a “Prevention of 
Infiltration Law” which would give Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) license to forcibly 
deport any Palestinian attempting to return to their homes. The language of this law also 
defined “infiltrators” as any internally displaced Palestinian in Israel as well, and because 
of this several thousand more Palestinians who still remained in Israel were deported to 
camps within the West Bank22. The infiltration law, passed in 1954, was simply a 
legalization of existing practices; the Israeli army had been systematically removing 
                                                   
19 Jiryis, Sabri (1981): Domination by the Law. Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol. 11, No. 1, 10th 
Anniversary Issue: Palestinians under Occupation. (Autumn, 1981), pp. 67-92. 
20 Morris, B. (2004). The birth of the Palestinian refugee problem revisited (2nd ed.). Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
21 Kirshbaum, David A. Israeli Emergency Regulations and The Defense (Emergency) Regulations of 
1945. Israel Law Resource Center, February 2007. 
22 "Prevention of Infiltration Law (1954)". Israel Law Resource Center. passed by the Knesset August 
16, 1954. Retrieved 4 June 2012. SOURCE: 'Laws of the State of Israel: Authorized Translation from 
the Hebrew, Volume 8'. Government Printer, Jerusalem, Israel (1948-1987), p. 133-7 
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Palestinians who had reentered after the war since 1950 as a way to “control the entry of 
Arabs into the new Jewish state”23.  
 This disregard for Palestinian rights was practically ignored by the International 
community, particularly the United States and the United Nations. While both actors 
affirmed the Palestinian right of return, both the U.S. and the U.N. did little to enforce or 
protect their rights. The closest the U.N. came to establishing a Palestinian right of return 
was a key component of the resolution admitting Israel as a member of the General 
Assembly, which stipulated that Israel “"unreservedly accepts the obligations of the 
United Nations Charter and undertakes to honour them from the day when it becomes a 
member of the United Nations”24. One of the obligations of the United Nations includes 
the support of the Palestinians’ right to return to their homes. Though Israel accepted the 
UN Charter, they refused Palestinians repatriation as national policy, and the UN did 
nothing more than affirm that Palestinians had the right to do it.  
 The international community U.N. partition plan, the admission of the State of 
Israel, and subsequent complacency regarding the infiltration law can be attributed the 
political agenda of the western world and the emotional climate following WWII. If 
Jewish refugees had their own state, they would not have to be resettled in European 
countries, and so the creation of the state of Israel was one way for western countries, 
particularly the U.K. and the United States, to disengage from Jewish refugees25.  At the 
                                                   
23 Korn, A.. (2000). CRIME AND LEGAL CONTROL: The Israeli Arab Population during the 
Military Government Period (1948—66). The British Journal of Criminology, 40(4), 574–593. 
Retrieved from http://www.jstor.org/stable/23638486 
 
25 THEORETICAL ANALYSIS AND BINATIONALISM. (2010). THEORETICAL ANALYSIS 
AND BINATIONALISM. In The Political Economy of Israel's Occupation: Repression Beyond 
Exploitation (pp. 188–201). Pluto Press. Retrieved from http://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt183gzjm.15 
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same time, the massive tragedy of the Holocaust meant that some form of reparation was 
in order: if not resettlement, in the form of a Jewish state26  
 Another sign of complacency regarding the repatriation of the Palestinians was 
their outright disqualification under the 1951 Convention on the Status of the Refugee. 
This document, which the world still uses to define the the rights afforded to refugees and 
the agencies responsible for their protection, was also used to disengage the United 
Nations from actually having to push for Palestinian repatriation.  
Article 1. of the 1951 convention defines a refugee as a person who, “owing to 
well- founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, 
membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his 
nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the 
protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country 
of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such 
fear, is unwilling to return to it”27. Palestinians, who fled the violence of the 1948 Arab – 
Israeli War, undeniably fall under the category of “refugee” .  
The 1951 Convention, though euro-centric in its creation of UNRWA and focus 
on immediate repatriation to their European country of origin, specifically excludes the 
Palestinians. By stating that the “Convention also does not apply to those refugees who 
benefit from the protection or assistance of a United Nations agency other than UNHCR, 
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such as refugees from Palestine who fall under the auspices of the United Nations Relief 
and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA)”28, the U.N. is 
actively denying Palestinians the benefits of the only charter, treaty, or document that 
specifically lays out the political rights of the refugee. While notes from the General 
Assembly state that this separation was to maintain the Palestinian refugees as an 
exclusive group who can continue to get relief from UNRWA, the result was the effective 
barring of Palestinians from ever returning home.  
As mentioned in the introduction, the UNHCR states three durable solutions for 
refugees are repatriation, resettlement, and local integration. Since Israel’s “prevention of 
infiltration” law ruled out repatriation immediately, the only “durable solutions” left, 
solutions that allow refugees to live their lives with peace and security, are resettlement 
and integration into host nations. For Palestinians, especially the poor neither of these 
were viable options. To resettle, or gain asylum into a wealthier nation, such as the 
United States, a refugee requires significant financial capital in order to make the 
journey. Furthermore, prove a need for political asylum in a way that normal refugees 
cannot. For this reason, many Palestinians who made it to the United States or Europe 
were wealthier Christians, who were able to both pay for the journey and state that they 
had faced religious persecution29.  
There is political integration, which means that a refugee has been given 
citizenship to another country, but there is also actual integration, when the refugee is 
allowed to actually participate in the political and economic spheres of a new nation. 
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With true integration, refugees are actually allowed to partake in the rights and public 
services that a normal citizen would have access to. True integration also requires similar 
financial capital, and education are in order to truly integrate into the Arab host nations, 
but even that is not a guarantee. 
 While immediately following the refugee crisis, some highly educated 
Palestinians were able to move to Jordan’s capital and participate in the government, the 
vast majority of Palestinian refugees were fellahin, farmers who could neither read nor 
write30. Furthermore, the integration of Palestinians was heavily dependent on Jordanian 
political interests, so much so that even Palestinians who were educated had difficulty 
integrating into Jordan’s economy and political systems.  
 If none of the three temporary solutions are viable for the Palestinians, then what 
is left? Without being able to repatriate, resettle, or integrate, The Palestinian refugees 
were left in a state of “permanent temporariness”31, where they lack both the autonomy 
and self determination any of the three solutions would provide for them. To be in a 
situation of “permanent temporariness” is to be in a state of abject poverty, without the 
ability to move, work, or live freely in any matter. A refugee in this situation is unable to 
support his or herself, instead utterly dependent on the good – will of international actors 
and the host nations.  
 The Palestinians in Jordan, the focus of this case study, fall firmly into the 
“permanently temporary” category despite outward political motions towards integration 
by the Jordanian state. Unlike the UNHCR, or even UNRWA, whose goals and mandates 
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are to provide services for refugees, Jordan was under no such obligation; they did not 
sign the 1951 Convention, nor did the Jordanian State feel morally responsible. Instead 
Palestinian lives became a cog in a wheel of political motives and aspirations, used only 
to suit the Jordanian state’s purposes. It is a situation that began bleakly, and would only 
become worse with each year, with each exacerbation of the Palestinian conflict, and 
with each political machination of the Jordanian state. 
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Economics of Annexation and Inclusion: 
 
Of the 750,000 Palestinian refugees expelled from their land, the majority found 
themselves completely barred from returning to their homes, and unwanted in the places 
they’ve fled to. Places like Lebanon and Syria prevented Palestinians from entering the 
workforce, accessing health or education resources, or utilizing the political rights that 
citizenship or legal residency would provide. From the very start, Jordan was notably 
different in its treatment of the Palestinians, even lauded in the international community 
as a “safe haven” where Palestinian refugees would be treated relatively well.  
 To this day, Jordan is the only Arab country to naturalize the refugees of the 1948 
exodus, giving Palestinians from the migration the opportunity to apply for citizenship. 
With citizenship, the Palestinians who took the offer became “Jordanians of Palestinian 
Origin” and gained access to Jordan’s public workforce, educational services, and 
healthcare. However, the reasons for this inclusion were far from humanitarian, instead 
calculated based on the Jordanian state’s economic and political interests. Rather offer 
protection out of kindness, Jordan became a place of refuge simply because it was 
convenient to do so at the time.  
 Since Transjordan’s (the British Mandate) creation in 1921, the country has been 
ruled by the Hashemite Royal Family. The Hashemite Royal Family is actually an 
extension of the ruling family in Saudi Arabia, implanted there by the British prior to the 
disbandment of the mandate.  Following the role of Jordan’s first king, Abdullah I, in 
inciting the Arab revolt that ousted the Ottoman Empire, the Hashemites have been the 
steadiest, most powerful actor in Jordanian politics. The interests of the Hashemite royal 
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family have been the strongest motivator of the Jordanian state’s domestic and regional 
policies.  
Though the Hashemites’ established a two house parliament following Jordanian 
independence in 1946, the two – house Parliament did not (and does not) have nearly the 
political clout as the King and his family. The prime minister is not voted in by the 
people, but rather appointed by the King.  In 1948, there was no illusion that the true 
levels of power lay with King Abdullah I32.  The will of the king is seen everywhere, 
from the core focuses of Jordanians refugee policies to the official name of the country 
itself: The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan.  
 The Hashemite’s interests within the Kingdom of Jordan are paramount; 
especially in their reaction to the influx of refugees. 750,000 refugees were pouring into 
the West Bank and across the Jordan River, and in immediate need of assistance, but this 
didn’t stop Lebanon & Syria from barring them from everything except the gate. Why 
would Jordan, with very few natural resources of its own, with a miniscule amount of 
political capital in the international community agree to not only take on this 
humanitarian burden, but actually begin to integrate the Palestinians by offering them 
Jordanian citizenship?  
 The answer lies more in Abdullah I’s vision for Jordan’s future and his concern 
with his political legacy, rather than the well-being of the fleeing Palestinians. Following 
the dissolution of the mandate, the King was acutely aware of the barriers preventing 
Jordan from enjoying economic prosperity33. Jordan did not have oil or access to sea 
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trade, like the gulf nations. The majority of the land in Transjordan was rough, sandy, and 
completely unsuitable for agriculture. Transjordan, dependent on dry farming, sheep and 
camel raising, was impoverished. Unequal distribution of the already low national 
income favored extended members of the Hashemite family, but  made the average 
Jordanians, including the Bedouins and merchants, who were non-Hashemites, poor and 
desperate.  Raids between the Bedouins and merchants occurred consistently and 
contributed to a rising crime rate34.   
 The tense relations between Hashemite, the non- Hashemite Bedouins other non-
Hashemite Jordanians were reflected in Jordan’s parliament, whose members were 
evenly divided amongst Hashemites and non-Hashemites35. The Hashemites represented 
their own interests (and by extension, the interests of the King) in Parliament, but the 
non-Hashemites represented the interests of their own groups, nomadic or not36. The 
clashes of these groups, within Parliament and on the streets, presented a security threat 
to the Hashemite regime. The political representation of the non-Hashemites began to 
shake the classist foundations of Jordanian society: many richer merchants were 
overtaking Hashemites as members of the upper class, a Jordanian nouveau riche that 
infuriated the poor Hashemite Jordanians37.  
During the Arab Israeli War of 1948, Jordanian forces had swept across the river 
into West Bank. Following the invasion of Jordan into the West Bank, Abdullah quickly 
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decided to annex the West Bank, keeping his armed forces in several key cities such as 
Bethlehem and East Jerusalem. With the annexation of the West Bank came 900,000 
Palestinians who were not refugees, but conquered along with the West Bank, as well as 
the 750,000 refugees that had fled in 1948.  
The annexation of the West Bank was a calculated move on behalf of King 
Abdullah I based on short lived economic advantages and the King’s hopeful political 
legacy. The annexation of the West Bank brought it refugees, yes, but it also brought the 
fertile land on the other side of the Jordan river. Though the West Bank is a significantly 
smaller area compared to the rest of Jordan, following annexation, the West Bank was 
home to more than 50% of Jordan’s viable agricultural land38. Initially, Jordan greatly 
benefited from the the West Bank’s stronger economy, and this includes Palestinians who 
contributed to the Jordanian economy. The Palestinians became a source of labor, and 
brought the  the tools of trades that gave comfortable livelihoods in Palestine. Many of 
these Palestinians, educated in their own right, were responsible for the urbanization that 
developed Jordan’s infrastructure following 194839. Many Palestinian refugees also 
transferred their bank accounts to Jordanian banks, bringing further capital into Jordan’s 
economy.   
The annexation of Palestine was also Abdullah’s first, tentative step towards his 
expansionist goals. Abdullah, formerly stifled by the priorities of the British mandate, 
saw his annexation of the West Bank as the first step to his ruling “Greater Syria”, his 
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imagined kingdom comprised of Transjordan, Palestine, Lebanon, and Syria, with his 
capital in Damascus. This expansionist interest was illustrated with Abdullah’s takeover 
of East Jerusalem, which he labeled “an integral part of the Jordanian state”40. In 
conquering Jerusalem, King Abdullah I declared the Hashemites “stewards of the Dome 
of the Rock”41. The Dome of the Rock is the third holiest cite in the Islamic world, and 
the mantle of the mosque’s “protector” added a  symbolic legitimacy to King Abdullah 
I’s expansionist ideals. This conquest also furthered King Abdullah’s religious and 
cultural significance in the Arab World, even rivaling that of Saudi’s ruling family, the 
protectors of the Kaabah (Islam’s holiest cite)42. Abdullah had hoped that with this new 
found religious significance, he would be able to expand further, even claiming 
Damascus as the “true capital of his Kingdom” in March of 194943.  
Despite King Abdullah I’s numerous reasons for annexing the West Bank, 
reactions within the Middle East and rest of the international community were mixed. 
The Palestinians themselves regarded the annexation of the West Bank between a range 
of ambivalence and hopeless acceptance. At the time, Palestinians were religiously 
disorganized, the average Palestinian unaware of the decisions of the muftis, the religious 
leaders that hailed from Jerusalem. The muftis trusted King Abdullah to protect the holy 
land, and save them, the people within it, from their wretched state, whilst a larger 
section of the ordinary Palestinian population were uninterested in the machinations of 
the ruling class, provided it did not effect their livelihoods44.  
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Thrown about amongst various other interests, the Palestinian refugees in the 
West Bank, just like the Palestinian refugees in Syria and Lebanon viewed their situation 
as temporary even as the deaths of their neighbors due to Israelis “infiltration laws” 
proved they may never return45. Even when Palestinians were offered citizenship by the 
Jordanian government , it is estimated that only 25% of Palestinian refugees took the 
offer46. Most Palestinians feared that taking Jordanian citizenship would impede their 
right to return to their own land47 . Overall, the Palestinian’s lack of political organization 
left them powerless: Gaza was quickly annexed by Egypt in 1948, and around the same 
time in Jericho, King Abdullah’s representatives where meeting with the muftis to declare 
King Abdullah I of Jordan the King of Palestine.  
Elsewhere in the Middle East, reactions to King Abdullah’s were incredibly 
negative. Once cause of the negative reaction was on behalf of the Arab constituents in 
Egypt, Lebanon, and Syria, who believed that the Arab-Israeli war of 1948 was fought to 
give Palestinians their homeland, and believed that the annexation (and Jordanian 
citizenship offered to Palestinians) directly contradicted this goal.  
The annexation also sharply divided the Arab League, the regional organization 
formed in 1945 to “"to safeguard their independence and sovereignty, and to consider in a 
general way the affairs and interests of the Arab countries”48. Whilst Jordan’s actions 
were supported by Abdullah I’s fellow Hashemites, the ruler of Iraq, Abdullah of Hejaz, 
who also supported the Hashemite rule of “Greater Syria”, they were sharply criticized by 
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many other leaders of the Arab League, particularly the Kingdom of Egypt, Lebanon, 
Saudi Arabia and Syria, who criticized its “lack of legal justification”49.These leaders 
were highly concerned with the annexation, Abdullah’s expansionist vision, and his 
separate dealings with Israel, the United States, and the United Kingdom. These countries 
almost immediately voted in an attempt to remove Jordan from the Arab League, though 
this was prevented by the  dissenting votes of Iraq and Yemen, which were also ruled by 
the Hashemite family. Though largely ignored by the international community Israel, also 
voiced its opposition to Jordan’s annexation of Jordan stating that it was a violation of the 
UN Partition Plan of 1947. The annexation was one of the beginning causes of tensions 
between Jordan and Israel, which only became worse throughout Jordan’s period of 
control over the West Bank.   
Though the rest of the Middle East hardly approved of Abdullah’s expansionist 
vision, the United States and the United Kingdom allowed it with little argument. King 
Abdullah I had garnered the approval of both countries by appearing as a “moderate” 
Arab Leader, especially when Abdullah I put forward his willingness to enter a separate 
peace with Israel (unlike the rest of the Arab League)50. Prior to World War II, the United 
States was primarily interested in maintaining connections to oil supplies in the Middle 
East, particularly in the new Saudi Arabia and Iraq51. Following World War II and the 
United Kingdom’s disengagement from the Middle East, the United States stepped in as a 
reluctant broker in Israeli – Palestinian affairs. And while the United States approved of a 
partition plan in 1947, it had no vested interest in the Palestinian people or a Palestinian 
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state. Palestinian or Jordanian, the nationality of the state didn’t particularly matter as 
long as United States’ own interests were secure. So while the United States did not 
recognize Jordan’s annexation of the West Bank, the United State’s refusal to disapprove 
outright was all the permission Abdullah needed to move forward.  
However, the outrage expressed by various Arab Leaders placed King Abdullah 
and his in considerable danger.  Without the support of leadership in Egypt and Saudi 
Arabia, his legitimacy was threatened on a regional scale52. The small sums the Arab 
League supplied for the procurement of supplies for Palestinians dried up before 1948 
ended. Though the United States and United Kingdom quickly came to the aid of the 
Hashemite monarchy, the mumblings heightened insecurities led King Abdullah I’s 
implantation of contradictory integration policy, which would mollify Jordanians as well 
as solidify his own rule as sovereign amongst other Arab nations. 
 The centralized Civil Law that was ratified at the first Parliament meeting in April 
of 1950, did nothing more than solidify the monarch’s power to govern, leaving him 
completely unaccountable to any other governing body and leave little scope for any 
opposition. Any parliamentary amendment which proposed to reduce his absolute power 
became instantly doomed to fail. The King reserved the power to call upon or dissolve 
Parliament at will, and authorize new elections at any time.  
 The ideals King Abdullah’s Western protectors, the United Kingdom and United 
States, claimed to champion, “civil rights” or “freedom of assembly” were considered a 
threat to the burgeoning Hashemite regime.  Censorship of the press was a given, and 
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serious opposition was subject to punishment from strict laws arbitrarily executed at the 
King’s will. 
 King Abdullah I was able to enforce his autocracy through his control of the 
Mukhabarat, the Jordanian general intelligence directory, as well as Jordan’s armed 
forces and Public police services, which could silence cries for a more constitutional 
monarchy both underground and in the open. But more importantly to Abdullah’s regime 
than brute force, was the support of the non-Hashemite local leaders, who he enticed by 
promising highly respected positions within his government53. By winning the support of 
village leaders, both religious and secular, he could appear as a popular leader in front of 
the international community as well as amongst the poor Jordanian villagers.  These 
village leaders and tribal elders could give King Abdullah’s expansionist vision and the 
annexation of Palestine a paternalist spin, retaining the support of the villagers and 
discouraging further political opposition.  
The tradition King Abdullah created would install itself throughout the history of 
Jordan The approval of Jordan’s local leaders, and its resulting influence on the King’s 
popularity amongst the poor masses, will remain a high security concern for every 
Hashemite King to follow in Abdullah’s footsteps. Though the King’s influence on 
Jordan’s politics prevent the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan from ever becoming a true 
democracy, or even constitutional monarchy, it gives the opinions of the average 
Jordanian population, and any inkling of discontent significant bearing on future kings’ 
political decision.  As a Hashemite King, it is not enough to be feared or respected. A 
Hashemite King must also be liked.  
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 One year after Jordan annexed the West Bank, it became obvious King Abdullah I 
took on more than he bargained for. Though initially the West Bank seemed like a 
fantastic economic prospect, it very quickly became a heavy burden. When the refugees 
first arrived in Jordan, their pressure on housing, particularly in the towns, created an 
unprecedented urban building boom in which refugee money and refugee skilled workers 
played a large part. But the relative addition to the labor supply from the refugee 
immigration far outweighed the relative addition to capital. Prices and rents rose 
encouragingly, but wages dropped.  
Palestinians, on average both more literate and more skilled than the Jordanians 
now faced extreme impoverishment coupled with the animosity of their poor Jordanian 
neighbors. Palestinians were better qualified for the high paying jobs in the government 
sector , where few stable careers remained. Though  Palestinians could initially gain the 
positions they were qualified for, it was only a short while before King Abdullah’s 
contradictory policies took shape, and Palestinians began to view the Jordanian 
governments motives for annexation with suspicion. The de facto denial of Palestinians 
from important positions began the tensions between Palestinians and Jordanians which 
would concern the Hashemites to this day.   
When it became clear by 1949 that offering Palestinians the political rights of 
citizenship could not solve the strain that several hundred thousand refugees were 
causing, Jordan began to pursue a two – sided policy with regards to the refugees’ 
political status: inclusionary and exclusionary54. It wanted to effect the political 
integration of the refugees, doing away with Palestinian separatism to maintain the 
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ownership Jordan had over the West Bank. At the same time, Jordan needed to ensure the 
permanent economic and general responsibility of the international community, so that 
Jordan does not get crushed under the economic burden.  
The Additional Nationality Law No. 56, passed by Jordanian parliament in 
December of 1949 is the first example of one of these numerous practical measures 
intended to maintain this “dual status” of the Palestinians55. The new law provided for the 
refugees’ participation in Parliament, the right to employment, the right to own property 
and other political rights, further promoting the inclusion of Palestinians into Jordanian 
society. This law abolished the short lived “Ministry of Refugee Affairs”, instead forming 
the “Ministry of Development & Reconstruction”. The wording of Law No. 56 carefully 
outlines the Jordanian state’s commitment to resettlement while contradictingly 
emphasizing the Palestinians right of return. The policy was designed by the Jordanians 
to appease the Palestinians, who, feeling antagonized in Jordan, were beginning to 
express nationalist sentiments. The seeming “temporariness” of the law also mollified 
poor, suspicious Jordanians who did not want the Palestinians there. While this important 
law guaranteed the rights of the Palestinians on paper, it will be shown that that equal 
access to important services such as work, education, and healthcare were hardly 
guaranteed. Various Jordanian bureaucracies, such as the ministries of heath, education, 
and planning, would impose various regulations barring Palestinians from the equal 
access to the services Law No. 56 entitles them to.  
 Formally, the West Bank was not annexed until April of 1950, and until then 
Palestinians only had the option of being granted Jordanian citizenship. The Palestinians 
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that did take up Jordanian citizenship moved across the Jordan river to the East Bank in 
search of better economic opportunities, and whilst these Palestinians were initially 
embraced by their fellow Arabs, the generous sentiment decreased rapidly as more than 
50,000 young, single men flooded the market and created formidable competition in an 
already over-saturated unemployed labor pool 56. Following official annexation, 
Palestinian citizens were offered citizenship automatically, in order to solidify Jordan’s 
annexation of the West Bank, even though Jordanians resisted integration and the 
decreased wages the influx of new, cheap labor caused57.  
With the new economic realities bearing down on the Jordanian state, it is a 
wonder how Jordan continued to offer citizenship, and the right it entails to refugees at 
all. Yet again, this was hardly a humanitarian act but the result of powerful international 
pressure from the United States and the United Nations.  Three political actors supported 
integration: the States of United Kingdom, the United States, and the United Nations.  
The war of 1948 led United States officials to conclude that American interests 
would be served best by minimum involvement in Palestinian politics. The United States 
policies following 1948 became vacilitive, moving from involvement to prevent a Soviet 
foothold in the Middle East, and disengagement58. The support of Jordan’s integration of 
Palestinian citizens came from a desire from United States officials to remain as far away 
from the refugee problem as possible. While President Truman used the Lausanne 
conference of 1949 to attempt to persuade Israel to make concessions regarding the 
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Palestinians right of return or otherwise lose the United State’s economic support, it 
proved wildly unsuccessful, and this would be the first and last time the United States 
would criticize Israel’s refusal of a Palestinian’s right to return. With that possibility out 
of reach, United States officials, including the State department, focused on the next best 
thing, which was promoting the Arabs to come to a solution as quickly as possible.  The 
United States’ support for Jordan’s integration of the Palestinians was a political move 
supporting what seemed to be the quickest way to decrease the number of refugees in the 
West Bank, rather than support of King Abdullah’s expansionism.  
Jordan appealed to the United Nations, the United States, and the United 
Kingdom for assistance, and both footed the bill. An important subsidy from the United 
Kingdom to maintain the Arab League gave Jordan more than $7.9 million in 1949. 
These subsidies, as well as further loans from the United Kingdom, helped the U.K. 
further disengage themselves from the plight of the Palestinian refugees.   Meanwhile, 
grants from the United States, which in 1949 began with value of more than $8 million, 
formed the beginning of United State’s true involvement with the Palestinian refugees as 
well as lay the foundation for the financial ties between the two countries which defines 
their relationship to this day59.  
The most important supporter of integration, and the backbone of services 
provided to the Palestinian refugees, was the United Nations. Since repatriation wasn’t an 
option for the Palestinians, the United Nation looked upon the example of the European 
refugees which were resettling and integrating into host nations with relative success.  
The U.N. General Assembly, recalling the agencies used to address the European refugee 
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process, supported the integration of Palestinians into other Arab states. As millions of 
refugees of numerous nationalities were able to find host communities or resettle with 
relative success, the United Nations supported integrations in hopes that the Palestinians 
could resettle permanently in an Arab country where both refugees and host citizens 
could share a language, religion and culture.  
Once it was clear to the United Nations that the Palestinians could not transition 
as smoothly as hoped, and the state Jordan continued to express the struggles struggling 
under the burden, in December of 1949 the United Nations General Assembly passed 
Resolution 302, which created the United Nations Relief and Work Agency (UNRWA). 
UNWRA much like the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Agency or International 
Refugee Organization, for European Refugees, was designed to be a humanitarian service 
for any refugee displaced in the Arab Israeli War of 1948.  
Like any non-governmental or international organization, UNRWA had to gain 
explicit permission from the Jordanian State to operate within its borders. The first 
agreement, signed by the Director of UNRWA and Jordan’s first Minister for 
Development and Reconstruction in 1951, vaguely lays out the terms of UNRWA’s 
tenancy within the West and East Banks. In exchange for UNRWA’s relative freedom in 
Jordan, the ability to move freely within the state, to travel between Jordan and other 
Arab countries, and to operate relief efforts with relative freedom, UNRWA assured the 
Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan that UNRWA will give the Jordanian government access 
to any of the services it imports into the state, important resources like petroleum, goods, 
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and finances that UNRWA can provide to the Palestinians60. UNRWA also agreed to pay 
the Jordanian government rent for any land occupied by refugee camps or UNRWA 
facilities, as well as pay for the rights to water. With this agreement, UNRWA, much like 
the United States, would quickly become the most important investors in Jordan, easily 
overpassing the United States in mere dollars donated, let alone the services UNRWA 
provided.  
Despite the similarities between the formative refugee organizations of the United 
Nations, UNRWA stands out simply because of its financial weight. While the United 
States involved itself in the reconstruction of Western Europe’s infrastructure and the 
United Nations refugee organizations were clearly temporary emergency services, 
designed just to get Europe back on its feet, UNRWA was immediately set up as a long – 
term development organization, taking over many of the social responsibilities the state is 
responsible for: education, vocational training, healthcare. The economic weight of 
UNRWA in Jordan cannot be understated; It not only supported the Jordan balance of 
payments but, in the first year of its mandate, was the largest local employer and the 
largest supplier and distributor in the country. Its food distributions, its housing 
programs, and its housing development schemes relieved the intense pressure on the 
labor market.  
Though it appears by the majority of the UNRWA/ Jordan agreement that 
UNRWA has essentially free reign in running its relief services, one lynch pin which 
would ensure the Jordanian government’s control over UNRWA’s services is Article IX 
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of the agreement. This section ensures that “the conditions under which works and 
reintegration projects are to be carried out shall be laid out in special agreements between 
the government of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan and the Agency [UNRWA]”. This 
statement reaffirms the Jordanian state’s sovereignty over UNRWA in a purposely vague 
way so that any and all projects UNRWA may carry out must first be approved by the 
Jordanian government.  
The interplay between Jordan’s affirmation of its own sovereignty and its 
economic dependence on international actors is crucial, since it directly affects the 
implantation of policies regarding refugees, Additional Nationality Law No. 56 and the 
UNRWA/Jordan agreement. The push and pull between various ministries, who must 
support the interests of the “original Jordanians”61, UNRWA, providing relief to the new 
“Jordanians of Palestinian Origins”: the 1948 refugees, and donors such as the United 
States, who above all protects its own interests in the middle east, leaves refugees and 
their day-to-day struggles in the midst. The dynamics will of various ministries with 
UNRWA and other actors will be broken down into the vectors of work, education, and 
healthcare in order to determine where the difficulties in inclusionary policies lies, and 
the lessons the Jordanian state learned as it reluctantly welcomes the Palestinians into the 
fold.
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Implementation of Inclusionary Policies 
 As stated in the previous chapter, Additional Nationality Law No. 56 gave every 
Palestinian refugee from the 1948 Palestinian exodus the opportunity to gain Jordanian 
citizenship automatically. But though this law promised the Palestinians of 1948 political 
rights, including the right to participate in government, the right to work, and the right to 
own property, the vast majority of the Palestinians had fled the Arab – Israeli war of 1948 
with little more than the clothes on their back. The economic boom King Abdullah and 
his advisors predicted never happened.  Instead, the cash influx from a few wealthy 
Palestinians was overshadowed by the several hundred thousand poor farmers and 
Bedouins that had fled from the historic Palestine with the little they could carry. For the 
fleeing fellahin: peasants that manned olive groves and orangeries, the land was their 
wealth, and that land was gone. In the West Bank, they were now desperately in need of 
shelter, food, and work.  
 For all of the 1950s, over 60% of UNRWA’s funding came from the United 
States62. This both reflects the United States emergence as a great power, as well as the 
United States’ interest in integration of the Palestinians into other Arab populations. Of 
the total funds, 61% was used for “relief”, which UNRWA defined as ration vouchers 
that Palestinians can use to purchase food, as well as supplies such as tarpaulin for the 
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sturdy tents for makeshift shelters, and sanitation supplies such as soap and oil with 
which to boil water and cook with63. While 3% was used for administrative costs (which 
included giving Palestinians their salaries), about 36% of the remaining funding provided 
was used to implement work programs, build schools and clinics, pay for health services, 
and donate construction supplies to local communities.  
 From 1950-1967,  UNRWA provided resources to Palestinian refugees as well as  
Palestinians who accepted Jordanian citizenship (the Jordanians of Palestinian origin). 
Despite their new Jordanian nationality, refugees who became Jordanians of Palestinian 
origin struggled to access basic services just as much as the refugees who chose to keep 
their defunct Palestinian passports. Until noted otherwise, when UNRWA refers to 
“Palestinian” in any of their statistical data, they are referring to both refugees and 
Jordanians of Palestinian origin alike.  
 A total of sixty UNRWA camps were raised in Syria, Lebanon, and Jordan (which 
refers to both the East and West Banks until 1967). Of these sixty, a total of twenty - 
three were in Jordan. It was important for the refugee housing to be of “comparable 
standard of living” to the local population, meaning that the quality of housing could not 
be better than that of the local Jordanians. Though UNRWA scouts had hoped to place 
the majority of the camps in the Jordan valley (about 100 km south of Jordan’s capital, 
Amman) large portions of the Jordan valley are inhabitable due to a lack of a water 
source.  These resultant camps were then placed on the outskirts of major cities, and 
mostly comprised of tents, but as years went on, became replaced with concrete barracks 
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and metal shanty houses, often comprised of zinc alloys)64.  By June of 1951, eighteen 
camps were raised in the West Bank, and five were established in the East Bank. Of the 
750,000 Palestinian refugees in both the West and East Banks, approximately 20% lived 
in barracks, 7% lived in zinc shanties, and 73% lived in tarpaulin tents65.  
Interestingly, about 2% (approximately $700,000) of UNRWA’s annual budget 
from 1951 – 1959 was given to the Jordanian state as “rent” for the ground the refugees 
camps were built upon, and another 1.25% was given to the Jordanian state to build roads 
and other infrastructure to and from the camps. The payment for land relates back to the 
agreement agreed upon between UNRWA and the state of Jordan prior to UNRWA’s 
implementation, but the donation UNRWA paid to Jordan for infrastructure was in hopes 
that a richer, more prosperous Jordan would integrate the Palestinians more readily66. The 
initial donations to Jordan, which accounted for 7% of Jordan’s GDP, gives the first 
indicator of how important UNRWA will become to Jordan’s economic viability over the 
next several decades 67.   
In the twenty-three camps, donations of items such as food and clothing supplied 
by more than 26 Christian missionary groups68. The donations of these missionary groups 
totaled almost $500,000 USD, an astounding amount for a series of churches. Missionary 
hospitals, such as the Red Crescent in Amman as well as the Jihad Hospital in the West 
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Bank city of Tulkaram donated their medical resources, tending to ill and injured 
Palestinians while UNRWA began to build clinics, schools, and  infrastructure69.  
The second director of UNRWA, John Blandford Jr, implemented most of the 
relief and works plans following the ground research conducted in 1949. Blandford was a 
consultant to President Harry Truman on the Marshall Plan for Europe70. UNRWA’s 
mission emphasized integration into the “Works”, rather than temporary relief . 
Blandford was a strong believer that the ‘works’ projects with UNRWA’s help would 
form ‘the antithesis of camp life and idleness’, so numerous works projects were intended 
to give the Palestinians a sense of economic autonomy.  
 UNRWA’s mechanism for relief featured several key areas: economic 
development, education, and health. The tent cities that rose within the West Bank and 
East Jordan were completely insufficient on their own, and it was the hope perpetuated 
by the integration that with enough initial development through the resources of the 
United Nations, as well as the assistance of more affluent Arab nations the Palestinian 
refugees would become self-sufficient, and UNRWA’s temporary mandate could remain 
just that.  
 UNRWA’s economic development strategies were two –fold, focused on the 
work projects within the camp and the encouragent of migrant travel; to bring economic 
development to the Middle East as a whole. A United Nations Economic Survey mission 
stated that at the time, the Middle East “suffers from poverty in the extreme” it also is 
“undoubtedly one of the potentially richest areas of the world” because of the large oil 
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reserves and access to sea trade71. Realizing that the main barrier to economic prosperity 
in the Middle East, UNRWA along with the rest of the General Assembly, reiterated the 
importance of continued investment to continue the economic development in the area.  
 
Work  
 In order to provide employment for Palestinian refugees without home or income, 
UNRWA used its funding to create several infrastructural projects that used refugee 
labor. These projects were small in scale, only employing 12,000 Palestinians across the 
East and West Banks, a sparse number compared to the number of refugees living in 
Jordan, which was more than 750,000. Of these 12,000 almost 40% were involved in 
agricultural projects funded by UNRWA, while another 20% worked in “unskilled labor” 
who worked in ports or construction72.  These UNRWA employees  refugees caring for 
refugees themselves, and higher level positions were reserved for international workers 
coming from the United States, Canada, and other parts of Western Europe.  
 UNRWA compelled other Arab countries, especially gulf countries such 
as Saudi Arabia to accept Palestinian refugees as economic migrants. Once Palestinian 
refugees were given Jordanian passports and became Jordanians of Palestinian origin, it 
was UNRWA’s hope that Palestinians, Jordan, and gulf nations would benefit. 
Palestinians would easily benefit from employment, the oil nations would benefit from 
the cheap labor Palestinians could provide, the Jordanian state would benefit from the 
influx of capital Palestinian brought back with them. The agency referred to the pursuit of 
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this method of economic development as “economic intelligence” that they felt would 
benefit the Arab world as a whole. 
 UNRWA calculated that approximately 150,000 Palestinians were employed 
through the private sector, such as the oil fields of Saudi Arabia or Kuwait73. This created 
various problems for the local Jordanians, who found the job market incredibly 
competitive. It was clear that the mostly nomadic Jordanians would be unable to compete 
with the Palestinians from the West Bank, which was more urbanized and had better 
education. Though cheap employment in the gulf countries was a quick, temporary 
solution, it often proved incredibly difficult for Palestinians to emigrate to gulf countries 
with the little economic resources they had.  Gulf countries like Saudi Arabia or Kuwait 
granted work visas to the more qualified Palestinian refugees over the average Jordanian, 
it only further added to simmering economic tensions despite formative integration 
policies. To many poor, native Jordanians Palestinians were beginning to overstay their 
welcome.  
 Once poorer Hashemites began voicing their discontent because of their lack of 
economic progress, King Abdullah I began to take it as a political threat. In another 
political move designed to solidify his own security, he began approving fewer projects 
in the West Bank and shifting UNRWA funds towards the East Bank, which though 
vastly underdeveloped compared to the West, had fewer refugee camps.  This 
redirectioning of funds was intended to further develop the infrastructure of the East 
Bank, benefiting both Hashemite and non – Hashemite Jordanians by developing roads 
and further urbanizing East Bank cities with factories and new residencies . The 
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urbanization of the East Bank encouraged greater Palestinian migration to the parts of 
Jordan with the most resources, and by 1952 more than 100,000 Palestinians refugees had 
migrated from the West Bank to the East in search of work, an unintended consequence 
of King Abdullah’s siphoning of funds74.  
Education:  
 The main UNRWA services that were developed in the years 1950 – 1956 were 
schools and clinics. In 1949, these services were not proposed offerings since the United 
Nations hoped the Palestinian refugees’ situation post – expulsion would be temporary. 
As two years passed without any progress towards repatriation, the United Nations 
believed that any agency for the Palestinians was to provide relief in the form of social 
services (again, avoiding the repatriation question entirely). It is important to note that at 
the time, UNRWA’s mandate was intended to last only three years;  in these formative 
years, UNRWA established numerous temporary schools which would only become 
more permanent with each year Palestinians could not return home. In order to maintain 
some sense of control over UNRWA’s activities, in 1950, Jordan began to organize its 
rudimentary bureaucracies, the Ministries of Health (MoH), Education (MoE), Interior 
(MoI) and the Ministry of Development and Reconstruction (MoDR). These 
bureaucracies were in existence since the 1920s, remnants of the bureaucracies formed by 
the British mandate, but only became fully utilized in the 1950s, once King Abdullah I 
realized the need for refugee management75.  
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For such a centralized government, prior to 1950 there was hardly any regulation 
or management of public services: schools, hospitals, and infrastructure were left to the 
devices of local village leaders. The creation and strengthening of these bureaucracies is 
critical for three main reasons. Centralized bureaucracies for services such as health and 
education formed the proverbial muscle through which King Abdulla can flex his 
interests when regulating the Parliaments very vague refugee policies. Furthermore, the 
nationalization of these services, and the seeming attention he seemed to give towards 
public services, increased his popularity amongst Jordanians, who were increasingly 
antsy in sight of the “benefits” the Palestinians seemed to be receiving in their new 
nation76. 
Overall, these ministries, particularly the MoI, which handles residency and 
employment regulations take advantage of purposeful ambiguity to create 
implementation protocols based on the political landscape and international pressures of 
the time. During the 1950s, the Ministry of Interior (MoI) worked closely with the 
Ministry of Development and Reconstruction (MoDR) to promote the inclusive / 
exclusive agenda of King Abdullah I, which ultimately was to improve the economic and 
social situation of Jordanians to improve his own political security77.  
The centralization of public services is most notably seen in access to work, 
education, and health services. This centralization, while strengthening the reach of the 
Jordanian government into the average citizen’s life, quite effectively segregated both 
Palestinians and Jordanians of Palestinian Origin, preventing them from integrating into 
Jordanian society . The MoI as well as the MoDR particularly limit the Palestinians 
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entrance into the Jordanian work force, by a stipulation in an article of the “Jordan 
Nationality Law”, which was ratified by Parliament in 1954, gives the Ministry of 
Interior the responsibility to determine that “non-Jordanians not compete with Jordanians 
for occupations in which a number of them were available”78. Though the law clearly 
states that Palestinians who became refugees in 1948 qualify as citizens, members of the 
Ministry of Interior used this law to effectively bar further educated Palestinian refugees 
from reaching high levels in the ministries or in the private sector, since many positions 
require work permits from the Ministry of Interior prior to hiring79.  
This de facto segregation was primarily due to Jordanian discontent at their poor 
situations compared to the Palestinians, who had the economic support of UNRWA while 
simultaneously receiving the benefits of King Abdullah’s inclusionary “Additional Law 
No. 56” which gave the Palestinian refugees Jordanian citizenship. Therefore, an 
inclusive law with contradicting implementation can satisfy Jordanian’s relationship with 
both the Palestinians and the Jordanians.   
UNRWA’s reactions to the silent barring of Palestinians from the private sector 
was regarded differently at various institutional levels. The upper level management, who 
was not Palestinian but rather international employees from Western Europe and North 
America, noted that “50% of Palestinians had difficulties gaining and retaining 
employment in the agricultural and labor sectors” in 1955, but did note in their missives 
to the General Assembly the effects this had on the Palestinian populations, including 
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UNRWA’s lower level staff80. The Palestinian members of the lower staff, including 
teachers, nurses and laborers, saw their qualified friends and students denied from 
positions for which they were qualified – for seemingly no reason. These burgeoning 
barriers to integration, particularly the inability to Palestinians to truly participate in 
Jordan’s economy, would lead to later tensions between Jordanians and Palestinians in 
the next decade and for decades after.   
The dichotomy between the “Jordanian system” and the “Refugee system” is at its 
clearest when observed in educational and healthcare services. Jordan’s educational 
system became centralized in a direct response to the attention and success UNRWA saw 
amongst its students. UNRWA’s schools were completely free to Palestinians, and 
offered primary education, secondary education and vocational training to both girls and 
boys81. The education was better than both private and public Jordanian schools; while 
the public schools only taught Arabic, arithmetic and history at the time, the UNRWA 
schools taught those as well as English and French82. The children at these schools, who 
took the same exams as Jordanian children in public and private schools, scored 
significantly better marks from 1953 – 196583. In addition to UNRWA’s standardized 
education, which exceeded the Ministry of Education’s own curricula, young boys were 
trained in vocations such as carpentry, shoemaking, weaving, tin-smithing, and 
agriculture. Palestinian students also had a chance to pursue higher education in the 
                                                   
80 UNRWA Special Report to the General Assembly, July 1955 No. 20 A/2213. Accessed December 
22 2015.  
81 Anderson, B. S. (2005). Nationalist Voices in Jordan : The Street and the State. Austin, TX, USA: 
University of Texas Press. Retrieved from http://www.ebrary.com 
82 UNRWA Special Report to the General Assembly No. 16 A/1705. Accessed December 7, 2015, 
Amman 1951.  
83 Talhami, G. H. (2003). Palestinian refugees: Pawns to political actors. New York: Nova Science. 
  
 
47 
universities of the West Bank, Damascus, Lebanon, and East Bank, thanks to their high 
test marks, education grants from UNRWA, and their new Jordanian passports84.  
While in the first year UNRWA’s schools only taught 32% of all Palestinian 
children in in comparison, in 1949, only 22% of Jordanian children were enrolled in 
public school85. While the British Mandate had installed an educational system in Jordan 
consisting of public, private and religious schools, public schools were difficult for 
Jordanians to attend, since there was a fee associated with entering primary school that 
many children could not afford86, and private schools were even more expensive. The 
free education offered to Palestinians incensed poor Jordanians, andwith this in mind the 
new King Hussein, the third King of Jordan, quickly began his educational reform in 
1953.  
 The first series of Jordanian education reform was ratified in response to the 
success of UNRWA’s schools. The Education Reform Law’s most important clause was 
to affirm education as a right for every citizen of Jordan without discrimination, as far as 
the government could provide it, and that primary education (which in Jordan lasts seven 
years) is compulsory for all Jordanian children87.   
Health  
Both Palestinians and Jordanians exhibited similar disease incidences prior to 
1948. In 1951, UNRWA and the World Health Organization  (WHO) surveyed both 
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native Jordanians and Palestinians to determine any significant differences in infectious 
disease health markers or quality life indicators. This research was then used by UNRWA 
and WHO to determine which health care services refugees needed most.  
WHO and UNRWA found significant differences in incidence for cases of 
venereal diseases, tuberculosis, typhoid, and measles, the most threatening infections of 
that time88. WHO found significant disparities in infant mortality, an epidemiological 
factor indicating overall quality of life89.  WHO predicted this was caused by crowding 
and poor living conditions within the camps. Palestinian Infant mortality rates were 220 
per 1000 live births, was worse than Jordan’s: 160 per 1000 live births. There were little 
organized maternal health services, and the medicalization of pregnancy and childbirth 
that had occurred by the 1940s in the United States had not yet reached the Middle East. 
Instead, care in childbirth was supplied by a local midwife, the Daya, a woman who 
traveled from village to village delivering other women’s children.    
  Both Palestinians and Jordanians exhibited comparable incidence rates of heart 
disease, diabetes, and tobacco use, though these illnesses weren’t concerns to WHO at 
this time. Infectious diseases such as malaria, typhus, dysentery, and venereal diseases 
were endemic across the Arab world, but exacerbated amongst Palestinians, creating a 
public health hazard, especially since these illnesses could spread to the native Jordanian 
population and cause an epidemic in the Middle East . UNRWA would use these 
indicators to determine what health services they provide to the Palestinians. 
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Prior to the implementation of UNRWA’s health services (1948-1950), sick and 
wounded Palestinians were treated by missionary hospitals, and relief NGOs such as the 
International Red Cross. The International Red Cross provided the most emergency relief 
from 1948-1950, treating wounded Palestinians for injuries such as compression 
fractures, leg injuries, and traumatic wounds which occurred as a result of the 1948 
exodus90. Other Muslim and Christian missionary groups in Jordan and the West Bank 
provided medical services for Palestinians living in camps, infectious diseases ran 
rampant due to exposure to the elements, poor living conditions, and overcrowding91.  
In 1951, UNRWA took over the allocation of healthcare services to the 
Palestinians alongside the World Health Organization (WHO) The epidemiological 
research conducted by (WHO) showed that Palestinians exhibited rates of infectious 
diseases; typhoid malaria, measles, acute conjunctivitis and dysentery at rates 
significantly higher than the Jordanian host population92. Poliomyelitis, a crippling 
neurological infection was also a very large concern to UNRWA and WHO, as several 
thousand children were exhibiting symptoms of the disease93 . These trends, along with 
the preexisting rates of infant mortality and life threatening chronic conditions, made 
healthcare an important priority for UNRWA.  
UNRWA and the WHO focused on implementing  two modes of healthcare 
services, general clinics, which provided overall health services, various “projects”  - 
                                                   
90 The ICRC and assistance to Palestinian refugees (1948-1950). (n.d.). Retrieved February 06, 2016, 
from https://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/misc/57jref.htm  
91 Annual report of the Director of Health / United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine 
Refugees in the Near East (1951). 
92 Annual report of the Director of Health / United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine 
Refugees in the Near East (1951). 
93  Annual report of the Director of Health / United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine 
Refugees in the Near East (1951). 
  
 
50 
specific plans targeting malaria, venereal diseases, maternal–fetal health94 and other 
sources of poor health within refugee communities. Both the clinics and projects were run 
out of tents and zinc shanties; intended to last only for only three years under UNRWA’s 
temporary mandate. However, UNRWA’s  Director of Health’s at the time predicted that 
the mandate would be extended, and then created “long term public health initiatives 
designed to better lifelong health”95. The intended longevity of these projects is yet 
another sign that UNRWA was not a temporary relief agent, but here to stay.  
Numerous clinic / small hospitals were established with each UNRWA center, 
equipped with physicians, nurses and other hospital staff. In 1952, before westernized 
medical education reached the Middle East, the employees of these healthcare workers 
were primarily international aid workers, either with the Red Cross, or nurses and medics 
from the militaries of the U.S. and U.K. 96. The clinics were also outfitted with hospital 
beds for more severe illnesses requiring inpatient services. The average UNRWA clinic 
in Jordan had about 150 inpatient beds. As a point of comparison, the average number of 
beds per hospital in the United States in 1950 was 190 beds, making the UNRWA clinics 
in the 1950s relatively well staffed97. UNRWA also engaged with other local hospitals 
within Jordan, subsidizing beds to be used by the Palestinian refugees. The healthcare 
services UNRWA provided had widespread use, and utilized by 349,000 refugees in 
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Jordan within their first year alone98. The need for healthcare services was so great that in 
1952, UNRWA added more than 300 additional clinics and hospital contracts.  
UNRWA pursued two different public sanitation projects to reduce the rate of 
infectious diseases. The first sanitation project installed sewage systems and water 
filtration, to provide refugees with safe water, a tactic used to address the endemic 
cholera in the Middle East. The second project, pest control, was designed to address the 
transmittance of vector diseases like malaria and typhus, both of which are spread by 
insects. Insect control included sprayings of repellants across camps as well as 
vaccination programs against typhus and paratyphus99. 
UNRWA’s special maternal health programs were more difficult for UNRWA to 
implement than the vaccination or sanitation programs, but were just as important to the 
health and well being of the Palestinian refugees. Because of long standing cultural 
positions on pregnancy and delivery, prior to UNRWA’s presence, women’s health was 
still completely unmedicalized. 
Childbirth was a family event, and welcoming a child into the world was ritual, 
with strong ties to Arab and Islamic tradition. Though Arab culture was, and remains, 
strongly patriarchal, in the instance of childbirth, tribal matriarchs had full domain. 
Grandmothers, mothers and aunts would assist in the delivery, guiding the mother from 
within her home. Following the childbirth, the mother that would feed the infant sugar 
from a date and whisper verses of the Qur’an to welcome her child into the world. 
Childbirth, like the rest of motherhood, was the woman’s sphere, the husband and other 
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men of the family were allowed to enter only after these rituals were completed . Even 
within difficult deliveries, the Daya, midwife, was always a woman  much like the 
mother’s own grandmother. The Daya, the most trusted figure in pre-westernized 
healthcare, was a wealth of knowledge and comfort that would travel from village to 
village assisting and placating mothers during woman difficult or even deadly 
deliveries100.  
The arrival of western gynecology, women’s health care administered by men, 
was often both inappropriate and an intrusion into the Daya’s and the mother’s territory. 
Pelvic examinations, which medical research has proven is essential to maintaining a 
woman’s gynecological health, were considered an assault on a woman’s privacy and 
many women chose not to use the maternal health services which were available at first. 
It was only after UNRWA physicians began educating the Dayateen ; teaching them the 
ways of Western medicine, that maternal health programs were more positively 
received.Despite the initial backlash against maternal services, by 1953 maternal health 
services were more accepted due to the participation of the Dayas, and routine 
examinations of pregnant women, distributions of milk, and hospitalized deliveries were 
used more frequently.  
In the first year of implementation (1950-1951) the UNRWA programs 
significantly improved the quality of life within the refugee camps. The vaccination 
program led by the WHO almost eradicated poliomyelitis, measles, and whooping cough, 
with the number of cases dropping from several thousands to simply hundreds. The 
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public sanitation program completely eliminated typhoid and cholera by July of 1952101. 
The maternal health program also succeeded, despite the initial hesitancy, in encouraging 
mothers to engage in more pre-natal programs such as pre-natal vitamins and 
examinations. UNRWA’s healthcare education program was credited, alongside 
UNRWA’s sanitation programs, in decreasing the incidence of infectious disease as well 
as improving the diets of the malnourished Palestinians.  
UNRWAs efforts were appreciated both by the local Palestinians who utilized 
their services, and the international community. General Assembly notes routinely 
recognized the efforts of UNRWA in the region and routinely called for increases in 
UNRWA’s funding, so that it could provide services at a greater volume. In one year, 
UNRWA created a name as an efficient U.N. body which could move quickly to provide 
services. The United States in particular raised its donations to UNRWA in 1952, a note 
from the United States’ ambassador Warren Austin to the General Assembly cited 
UNRWA’s organizational structure as a main reason for increasing UNRWA’s funding 
from 1951 to 1952102.  
 But despite the great bounds of UNRWA’s health sector within its first two years, 
there was still so much more that needed to be done. While able to provide primary care 
and diagnose illnesses, neither UNRWA nor WHO had the supplies, healthcare 
infrastructure, or funds to treat the endemic chronic illnesses which plagued Palestinian 
refugee populations. UNRWA and WHO could only tell the Palestinians which diseases 
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they had, without any chance of making them better. Funding, or the lack of it, would 
only become more important to UNRWA with each passing year.  
 However well received UNRWA was by the international community, Jordanian 
citizens were less than pleased by the special treatment the refugees appeared to be 
getting. Comparatively, Jordan’s healthcare infrastructure was much weaker, even though 
UNRWA and who had only been active one year. In fact, the care Jordanians received 
from their own health services seemed dismal when compared to UNRWA’s more 
organized, higher quality system. UNRWA gave more than $500,000 to the Jordanian 
government each year to implement healthcare reforms, but Jordanian there were no 
signs of its implementation in terms of health outcomes (such as decreased mortalities) . 
To many poor Jordanians, the Palestinians, despite their displacement, where inherently 
better off than their Jordanian counterparts.  
 It is important to note that in UNRWA’s early years, the Jordanian healthcare 
system did benefit from UNRWA’s presence. The medical advancements, such as public 
sanitation, insect eradication and maternal fetal health, also benefited Jordanians. 
Jordanian physicians and Dayas, benefited from Western medical education.  
 King Abdullah I, quickly began implementing a series of healthcare reforms as 
soon as UNRWA’s high performance was noticed by the general Jordanian population. 
However, unlike education reform, which was ratified through different legislative laws, 
the implementation of health reform was left almost entirely to the Ministry of Health 
(MoH), established in 1951 by the General Health Law, which was ratified in Parliament 
a year earlier.  
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 Even as early as 1950, the Ministry of Health had large administrative leeway and 
several different duties. The MoH was distributed funds to each hospital, clinic, in 
Jordan, and determined resource allocation to higher medical education. In only the first 
year as an active Ministry of Health, the MoH created a nursing school and began the 
process of creating a medical university, which would open with the University of Jordan 
in 1962.  
 The MoH used the majority of the funding they received from UNRWA to 
expand the Medical Services in the East Bank, mainly in the capital, Amman. By 
advancing services in the East Bank, no Palestinian, refugee or Jordanians of Palestinian 
origin in the West Bank could not access the Jordanian health system. The MoH also 
used the funding it received from UNRWA to increase existing capacities in hospitals 
that were already running103. But while hospitals in the East Bank were benefiting from 
UNRWA funds, hospitals within the West Bank were flailing, running out of supplies 
and increasingly relying on UNRWA for support.  
 Healthcare, in many ways, was already showing signs of discrimination, by the 
very nature of which hospitals got funding, and new medical where medical centers were 
being opened. While not discriminatory outright, the allocation of funding from the MoH 
was already starting to exclude Palestinian refugees, many of which had no access to 
Jordanian services, which as citizens, they had a right to.  
The Push and Pull: Jordanian Policies and Access to Services 
 The relationships between UNRWA and the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, the 
Hashemite ruler’s relationships with Jordanians and Palestinians, and Jordanian 
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relationships with Palestinians, are fraught with complexity. The aftermath the violence 
in 1948 as well as a hasty reconstruction left each group dissatisfied with their political 
position as well as their quality of life. The Palestinians were still waiting for an 
actualized right of return. The Jordanians, after a few years, felt that the Palestinians had 
outstayed their welcome. The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan and the new King Hussein 
were primarily concerned with the security of the royal fan, which was continually 
threatened by Jordanian poverty.  
 UNRWA, given the responsibility of keeping Palestinians alive, encountered the 
difficulties that came with attempting to care for an unwanted population in a state 
reluctant to truly care for them. Despite this, UNRWA became the second most important 
political actor in Jordan, second only to the King himself in influencing political 
decisions. Without UNRWA, Jordan would have had no way to care for the hundreds of 
thousands of refugees King Abdullah I hastily adopted in his quest for Hashemite 
expansion. UNRWA, even when not dealing with the Jordanian state directly; through 
agreements and funding deals, influenced the Jordanian state merely by providing for the 
Palestinians and inciting the discontent of the Jordanian population. By 1953, UNRWA 
had become a formidable force within Jordan, and their actions within the country 
instigated the creation of ministries, the very same ones that would begin to deny 
Palestinians rights and services only fifteen years later.  
UNRWA and Jordan, at best, had an uneasy, tense alliance, held together only by 
tiny threads of mutual need. UNRWA needed Jordan to uphold its agreements, so that 
UNRWA could act in Jordan with relative autonomy. Jordan not only needed UNRWA to 
provide services for the Palestinians, but the funds that UNRWA brought for Jordan’s 
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own development. Without UNRWA, and other donations from places such as the U.S., 
Jordan would simply be unable to exist as a state. However, even with UNRWA’s help, it 
was incredibly important for the Jordanian state to maintain the refugee identity of the 
Palestinians so that the Jordanian state could continue to garner funding from wealthier 
nations in the name of refugee protection.   
In a sense, by providing so many services to the Palestinians, and not encouraging 
full integration with Jordanian ministries, UNRWA was actually assisting the Jordanian 
state in maintaining refugee exclusivity. Within the next fifteen years, the tensions within 
Jordan between Palestinians and Jordanians, UNRWA and the Hashemites would reach a 
tipping point which would forever change Jordan’s stance on integration. This change in 
position would drastically change the state of the refugee in Jordan, whether they be 
Palestinian in 1967 or Syrian today. 
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An Uneasy Calm before the Storm 1950- 1967 
 The creation of the state of Israel, the Arab Israeli War, and the resulting 
displacement of 750,000 Palestinians irreparably altered the political framework of the 
Middle East. Jordan, like the other post-colonial nations in the Middle East, was 
attempting to define itself as a state both internally and regionally from within a sea of 
upheaval. The heavy involvement of the international community only added to the 
complex political dynamics of the Jordanian state from an internal, regional, as well as 
international perspective.  
 Despite UNRWA’s presence in Jordan to help bear the burden of the Palestinian 
refugees and Jordan’s own political reforms from 1949-1950, Jordanians felt the state’s 
precarious economy in their access to work, education, and their healthcare services.  
These worries reflected from the bottom up: the voices of the poor Jordanians, Hashemite 
and non-Hashemite alike were heard by the tribal leaders that held great sway in Jordan’s 
parliament, bureaucracies and militaries. In the face of pervasive anxiety, non-Hashemite 
political actors saw their chance to usurp the Hashemites of their political influence. The 
period between the 1948 Arab Israeli Conflict and the Six-Day-War of 1967 is defined by 
this political instability, as eachJordanian political actor, Hashemite or not, nebulously 
tried to maintain their influence and power in the small arena of Jordanian politics.  
King Abdullah I was assassinated in 1951, in the immediate aftermath of his 
assassination, two separate spheres of political activity began to evolve. The first was 
within the framework of Jordan’s parliamentary structure, as Hashemites and non-
Hashemites parried for political favor amongst the Jordanian people, and within Jordan’s 
  
 
59 
parliament and bureaucracies, while educated Jordanians of Palestinian origin attempted 
to break in. With only a few notable exceptions, Jordanians of Palestinian origin were 
largely barred from the political arena.   
King Abdullah I ruled Jordan with a firm hand, obsessed with his vision of 
“Greater Syria” and a unified Arab nation ruled by the Hashemites. Kingdom of Jordan’s 
expansionist goals were lost without King Abdullah I’s strong leadership.  His successor 
King Talal, weak in health and political might, King Talal’s short reign threw the upper 
echelons of Jordan’s political structure were tossed into turmoil, allowing the seeds of 
non-Hashemite political discourse to take root.  
The relationship between the late King Abdullah I and his eldest son, Talal , was 
known as tense at its very best, physically and emotionally abusive at its worst.  It was 
known throughout Jordan that King Abdullah I had little faith in his son, calling him a 
“simpleton”, “drunkard” and “kafir” (infidel) on numerous occasions within Hashemite 
court104. As the young Talal grew, traveling to European schools to be free of his 
domineering father, he swore that as a ruler, he would be everything his father was not. 
And while King Abdullah I was a strong, ambitious, capable statesman, his son was aloof 
and withdrawn from political affairs, preferring to let others rule for him, creating a small 
power vacuum in his absence.  
Though King Talal’s abusive (albeit royal) childhood had a profound effect on his 
leadership capabilities and his skills of governance, his mental illness could have had just 
as much effect on his short lived reign. King Talal was posthumously diagnosed with 
residual / catatonic schizophrenia, most often described as “a disinterest in life”. He was 
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often described by his companions as “preferring more to rest and lounge than to rule”105 
King Talal spent the last year of his reign in a Switzerland sanatorium, leaving Jordan to 
be run by the Parliament which quickly tried to limit the monarchy’s power .  
Whatever the reason for King Talal’s disinterest in politics, his political weakness 
created an opening for the Parliament to begin to limit the power of the monarchy. The 
most notable champion of this stance was a Jordanian of Palestinian origin named Tawfiq 
Abu l-Huda, the prime minister during King Talal’s two years of rule.  
Tawfiq Abu l-Huda, Jordan’s prime minister from 1951 – 1954, was the severest 
threat to the Hashemite regime106. A lawyer trained in Istanbul, and who worked under 
King Faisal of Syria, Abu l-Huda quickly rose through the ranks of Jordanian 
bureaucracy, becoming a member of King Abdullah I’s cabinet in 1929. Though 
originally from historic Palestine, Abu l-Huda quickly claimed Jordanian nationality 
when it became available in 1950107.  
Abu l-Huda, ambitious, intelligent, was more similar in personality to the King 
Abdullah than Talal. However, without the presence of King Abdullah I to keep him in 
his place, Abu l-Huda spent his time in Parliament undermining King Talal, and quickly 
claimed the King’s ability to make executive decisions for himself, including jailing 
several of his political opposition in 1951108.  
Abu l-Huda focused on solidifying the power of the upper levels of Parliament as 
quickly as possible. Throughout the short reign of King Talal, Abu l – Huda used King 
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Talal’s more liberal leanings, his need to be exactly like his own father, and most 
important, his absence due to his mental illness, to pursue his own agenda.  
 Like King Abdullah, Abu’l – Huda’s goal was to “project a liberal image with the 
assurance of a predetermined outcome”, to maintain the image of a democracy while 
ruling with an iron fist. Abu’l-Huda’s political reforms to the Jordanian constitution 
showcase his focus on his own security as the prime minister, not the political rights of 
his constituents109. The new Jordanian constitution, ratified by an ill King Talal in 1952, 
promised work, education, freedom of speech and the press to Jordanians. Conveniently 
for Abu’l-Huda, the constitution also granted the prime minister the power to order 
arrests without probable cause, give executive orders to the ministries, and realign 
Jordan’s cabinet. The new constitution attempted to limit the power of the monarchy, 
stating in the constitution that the  “the nation”, not the monarchy, was the “source of all 
power”110. In exchange for this litany of liberal commitments (such as free speech), each 
of these rights were contingent on the “limits of the law”, giving Abu’l – Huda and 
subsequent authorities considerable latitude in determining what these “limits” actually 
were through his control of Jordan’s bureaucracies111.   
 Much like Abdullah I, the tension between Palestinians and Jordanians was 
becoming a concern for Abu’l-Huda, and was only exacerbated by worsening economic 
circumstances112. 1953 was a particularly brutal year; a drought exacerbating the tensions 
causes by economic security. The loss of wealthy Palestinian capital via resettlement, 
high customs tariffs, exhaustion of resources by the Palestinian refugees, and the burden 
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of a largely unemployed population were making Abu’l – Huda’s fears of Jordan’s 
economic unviability a reality. 
 In an attempt to resuscitate Jordan’s economy, Abu’l – Huda implemented 
austerity measures reflected in cuts in funding to Jordanian education and healthcare. 
Abu’l – Huda’s extreme cuts on government spending, a fiscally safe move which gained 
approval by UNRWA and the United States, enraged the rest of Parliament and the 
Jordanian community. His austerity measures, which halted government expenses by 
11%, increased the Jordanian State’s dependency on UNRWA and aid from the 
international community113. The result was a halt in the numerous health and education 
reform King Abdullah promised prior to his death. These austerity measures 
disproportionately affected the Jordanians of Palestinian origin and Palestinian refugees, 
people who needed these services just as much as native Jordanians. Without wastah, 
connections to the bureaucracies, the average Jordanian of Palestinian origin was unable 
to get the services they needed. Conversely, Jordanians, particularly those who could 
claim a connection with the important tribes, had little trouble accessing healthcare or 
education.  
The royal political tactic of assuaging the poor Jordanians is a common theme 
throughout the history of the Hashemite’s political policy, in King Abdullah’s, Abu’l-
Huda’s and King Hussein’s rule. At the same time in Jordan’s history, Palestinian 
nationalism was beginning to take root in both the West and East Bank, spurred by the 
lack of political representation, and right to services their Jordanian citizenship promised. 
Unable to overcome the “laws” that ministries deployed at will to deny access to 
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secondary education or secondary health services, it became clearer to Palestinians that 
the only place they would be treated fairly was in a nation of their own making.  
 The second sphere of political activity, forming outside of the halls of parliament, 
were the stirrings of Palestinian nationalism. While many Jordanians of Palestinian origin 
and Palestinian refugees hoped that Abu l-Huda’s rise to power would enfranchise them, 
the political advancement of Palestinians stagnated in favor of Abu l-Huda’s political 
security in Parliament. In 1952, parliament had been evenly split between Jordanians of 
Palestinian origin and native Jordanians, a move championed by Abu l-Huda to instill a 
sense of loyalty and belonging amongst Jordanians of Palestinian origins. By 1954, this 
ratio shifted, with a far greater number of native Jordanian seats in order to mollify the 
native Jordanians Abu l-Huda needed to keep his power. Furthermore, Abu l-Huda’s 
active denial of his Palestinian heritage, incensed Jordanians of Palestinian origin and 
Palestinian refugees, particularly the well-educated who were unable to enter Jordan’s 
political forums.   
 The whispers of Palestinian nationalism were strongest amongst the elite, the 
educated, economically secure Palestinians who were only welcome in Amman as long 
as it was convenient for the crown. These Palestinians, some of whom had been high 
ranking officers or government ministers during the reign of King Abdullah I, were 
quickly disillusioned with King Hussein, who manipulated local, municipal, and 
Parliamentary elections in order to quash any Palestinian political opposition. These 
fledgling opposition parties were unable to gain a foothold in Parliament, nor gain 
standing with the poorer Palestinian population. Amongst the poor, political groupings 
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were based more on collective economic and social interest, rather than higher-level 
interests such as national identity or “political belonging”114.  
 While the Palestinian national movement was largely unorganized in the 1950s, 
this would soon change with the pan-Arab awakening and renewed devotion to the 
Palestinian cause created by students in Egypt, Lebanon and Kuwait. The Fatah 
movement, the word Fatah meaning “to open” as well as a reverse acronym of Harakat 
Al – Tahrir al-watani Al- Falastini, the “Palestinian National Liberation Movement” 
were the first real beginning of the sort of nationalism which would seriously threaten the 
security of King Hussein’s regime. Fatah, founded in 1955 in Kuwait by several 
Palestinian activists, notably Yasser Arafat, Khalil al-Wazir, Salah Khalef, Farouk 
Kadoumi, and others, presented itself first as a “national movement” rather than a 
political body.  Fatah, and other spin off groups such as the “General Union of 
Palestinian Students” sparked interest in Palestinian nationalism within Jordan that the 
Hashemite Kingdom, distant, unhelpful, and unjust blatantly lacked115.  
 Palestinian nationalism also blossomed within UNRWA schools, where 
Palestinian teachers began introducing discussions of civil discourse into their 
classrooms116. UNRWA’s employees, all Palestinian refugees, openly emphasized the 
rights of the refugee, particularly the right of return passed in the General Assembly 
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Resolution 194117. These teachers were politically literate, recognizing that UNRWA’s 
assistance program was “regarded not just as a temporary international charity venture, 
but above all as recognition of the refugees' status as refugees endowed with political 
right”118.  
It was during those same pre-PLO years that the Palestinians began to see the 
agency as an informal institutional framework within which the rehabilitation of 
Palestinian society could take place. The political literacy of UNRWA’s teachers was 
passed down to UNRWA students, who would then join the student groups created by 
Fatah, and others. Palestinian nationalism flourished under the UNRWA agreement 
signed with Jordan in 1950, wherein the Jordanian state promised non-interference in 
UNRWA schools so long as the education was comparable to that of Jordanian public 
schools.  This remained a cause of unease throughout Abu’l – Huda’s tenure , and would 
follow King Hussein until the mid-1970s.  
 King Hussein was crowned in 1952, but was controlled by a regency council, 
headed by Abu’l – Huda and other cabinet members. By the time of his enthronement, 
King Hussein clung to the little power the crown possessed, and he needed to reclaim his 
position in the eyes of Jordanians as well as in the eyes of the Middle East’s regional 
powers . The subsequent years following King Hussein’s ascension to the throne would 
be filled with Hussein’s scrambling to maintain political majority within parliament, 
appease the Jordanians, quash Palestinian nationalism, and establish as much control over 
UNRWA as possible. Regaining his control of Jordan was Hussein’s ultimate goal, a 
control bought with the rights of the several hundred thousand Palestinians who still have 
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not achieved a durable solution they were owed. In his own quest for control of his 
kingdom, King Hussein’s decisions played an important role in the tensions that would 
continue to undermine it. 
Despite all that King Abdullah I and Abu’l-Huda had in common, Abu’l-Huda’s 
regional policy directly undermined that of King Abdullah I’s expansionist vision. Abu’l-
Huda actually spent 1950-1954 appeasing the Syrian and Egyptian heads of state, 
Jordan’s commitment to the Arab League and restating Jordan’s support for a Palestinian 
state.   
 King Hussein started this transformation by removing all British military forces 
from Jordan, as well as remove any non-Jordanians (British and Palestinian) from 
positions of power within the Jordanian army. He replaced all British and Palestinian 
officers with tribesmen of the East Bank, from the disadvantaged, poorer cities of Al-
Karak and Al- Salt. The realignment of the military served the purpose of securing the 
loyalties of the southern tribes, enticing them away from Abu’l-Huda with high ranking 
military positions, a tactic that both King Abdullah I and Abu’l-Huda have used to garner 
loyalty. These tribal families have remianed fiercely loyal to the crown, and cherish the 
late King Hussein’s memory today..   
 King Hussein cleaned out parliament similarly, dissolving the government and 
supporting the campaigns of loyal politicians. During the late King Talal’s rule, political 
representation was split equally amongst West Bank and East Bank, Palestinian and 
Jordanian alike. . King Hussein’s realigning of the Parliament essentially destroyed any 
of the Palestinian / West Bankers political representation, instead concentrating on the 
poor Jordanians of the East Bank. Interestingly, Abu’l – Huda, died in a suicide that was 
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never confirmed in 1955. Several Jordanian historians have viewed the released cause of 
death with skepticism, going as far as to claim that King Hussein may have ordered his 
death119.   
 To King Hussein, squashing Palestinian nationalism was almost as important as 
appeasing the poor Jordanians, since this nationalism was a threat to Hashemite regime 
for several reasons. It was important for King Hussein to dispel any notions regarding a 
Palestinian state in order to maintain political and economic control of the West Bank. 
Secondly, even as King Hussein attempted to remove Palestinians from participating in 
politics, they were still the largest internal contributor to the Jordanian economy. But 
most importantly, if Palestinians were given a state, or if Palestinian refugees were no 
longer present, Jordan would lose the presence of UNRWA and all the financing and 
infrastructural support UNRWA provided. Therefore, it was crucial to both the political 
and economic security of King Hussein’s regime for Palestinians to remain on the fringes 
of society, both politically and economically.  
 At first Fatah encouraged economic support for the Palestinian cause; 
investments to liberate the occupied land provide financial and military assistance to the 
Palestinian people overcome its problems. In this way, Fatah was an unapologetic 
champion of the Palestinian cause in a way that Jordan, an active opponent of Palestinian 
nationalism, would never be. While at first the movement was largely disorganized, and 
the political rhetoric limited to students within UNRWA, by the end of the 1950s,  
different groups of Fedayeen , freedom fighter groups (which included not only the PLO 
but the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) ) began to organize and 
                                                   
119 Ibid, Satloff, R. (2004) 
  
 
68 
move back and forth from Israel to Jordan with the support of Fatah who viewed the use 
of violence as “necessary” in order to win back their state120.  
 While the Fedayeen were largely inefficient in terms of military prowess, it 
caused multiple problems for the regional Arab community, worsening the already 
existing tensions between Israel, Jordan, and Egypt. In response to the Fedayeen attacks, 
Israeli Defense Forces indiscriminately attacked villages within the West Bank, despite 
the 1949 Armistice Agreement and the censure of the United Nations and United States. 
One notable attack was the Qibya Massacre (1953), in which sixty-nine Palestinian 
civilians unrelated to the Fedayeen were killed, forty-five houses a school, and a mosque 
were destroyed121. Israeli Defense Forces believed that the Fedayeen were using these 
schools as a base camp, and attacked them indiscriminately122.  
The censure Israel received from the international community did not stop the 
Israeli attacks on Palestinian villages inside the Green Line, but these attacks did succeed 
in forcing Jordan to better control the Fedayeen, patrolling the borders more carefully and 
arresting Fedayeen members. By 1958, about half of the Palestinians in Jordanian prisons 
had been arrested for “infiltrative crimes”123.  For many Palestinians, this was seen as a 
complete betrayal of the Palestinian cause. Egypt in particular echoed this belief, and the 
Egyptian state openly supported Fedayeen raids in the Gaza Strip124.   
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Jordan’s censure of Palestinian discourse and attempts in destroying Palestinian 
nationalism succeeded in further alienating other Arab states, particularly Egypt. Gamal 
Abdel Nasser, Egypt’s president, openly called upon King Hussein to support a 
Palestinian state. Nasser would utilize public radio to both encourage the Fedayeen as 
well espouse his vision of a pan- Arab state. A coup d’etat in Syria had overthrown the 
royal family, allowing the Baa’th party to gain power. The resultant closeness between 
Nasser and the Syrian Baa’thists were a threat to Hashemite stability.   
The regional pressures on Jordan furthered King Hussein’s reliance on the United 
States and the United Kingdom.  The United States, the United Kingdom, and United 
Nations, their perception of the climate in the Middle East, and efforts to thwart the 
Soviet Union began to heavily play into King Hussein’s decision-making. This created a 
difficult juggling act, balancing King Hussein’s need to please Jordanians, and please the 
international community, whose funding Jordan relied on.  
For the most part, Jordan navigated these waters by assuaging both the U.K. and 
the U.S. via secret meetings while openly supporting Egypt in its antagonism of the U.K., 
particularly during the creation of the Baghdad Pact and the Suez Crisis. While the 
United Kingdom was disengaging politically from Jordan, removing all of its military 
personnel and limiting its financial support to construction and other infrastructural 
subsidies, the U.K. renewed its interest in the Suez Canal. The U.K. needed the Suez 
Canal to fulfill its numerous obligations of  pacts made following WWII to maintain 
Western influence. The Canal also held the economic interest of the U.K., and was still 
used for commerce and trade.  
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Egypt’s nationalization of the Suez Canal put King Hussein in a tight spot. In 
private, King Hussein assured diplomats of the United Kingdom that the Hashemite / 
British alliance was strong. Through 1958, riots supporting Arab unity and anti-British 
sentiment gave Hussein even more threats to his regime. In response to these changing 
sentiments, Hussein crushed an attempted military coup, banned all political parties and 
Egyptian radio stations, placed Jordan under martial law,  and began tamping down on 
any protests125. Despite that, numerous events, from the coup d’état which overthrew the 
Iraqi Hashemites or the bombings of the British Council or Ministry of Development in 
Amman by Arab nationalists, made Hussein realize the precariousness of his position.    
In a political move that would begin to establish the U.S. as leading power in the 
Middle East, Jordan asked to be included in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
(NATO). However, due to the heavy anti-British sentiment in both Parliament and the 
public, Jordan declined membership to Baghdad Pact, an intergovernmental military 
alliance with Iran, Iraq, Pakistan, Turkey, and the United Kingdom. While Jordan was not 
allowed entry into NATO, it cleanly broke any outward political ties Jordan had with the 
U.K. and paved the way to becoming a client state of the United States126.  
When it became clear that not even martial law could completely stop sympathies 
with Egypt, King Hussein conducted yet another purge of Parliament in 1960. King 
Hussein also swept the military for “communists”, sacking at least fifty officers for 
suspected “party ties” and several thousand activists with “leftist ties”127. This 
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clampdown and the resulting autocracy, ceased the illusion of civil discourse or liberties. 
No one would be able to threaten King Hussein’s regime so openly again. Washington 
D.C. understood King Hussein as a ruler not easily overthrown, and the Eisenhower 
administration gave unconditional backing for the Hashemite regime to continue to 
restore order via force. The White House released a public statement declaring Jordan’s 
“independence and integrity” as central to U.S. interests, and the relationship was 
solidified.  
In fiscal terms, the United States resolved the crisis. Days after Hussein declared 
martial law, the Eisenhower administration authorized a $10 million emergency grant to 
address the near bankruptcy of the Jordanian government. Later that year, the United 
States cleared another $10 million grant for the Jordanian spending budget. In a year, 
when the Jordanian state collected only $27.6 million in domestic revenues but spent 
nearly $37 million on internal policing and the military, this aid kept the regime afloat. 
These supplements allowed for the payment of salaries to most civil and military 
employees, who were subject to pay cuts from Abu’l-Huda’s austerity measures in 
1953128.  
The regime also began receiving American weaponry in order to boost capacity to 
police society. During that same summer of 1957, the Eisenhower administration 
announced an initial $10 million arms grant consisting of firearms, spares, and light 
equipment so that the Jordanian army could plug any immediate material shortages and 
maintain readiness for deployment given the state of emergency129.  
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Each year leading up to the Six-Day War grew more tense, and the resulting 
actions taken by King Hussein grew more extreme. But even with the fear both inside 
Jordan and out, King Hussein took no legal measures to refoul Palestinian refugees, or 
remove their citizenship. King Hussein needed the Palestinians, an uneasy alliance 
necessary for economic survival. Palestinians were constantly the victims of systematic 
discrimination at the hands of Jordan’s bureaucracies, but these injustices slid underneath 
law as the effect of an autocratic ruler focused on maintaining the security of the regime.  
This would all change with the Six – Day – War of 1967. The tensions that had 
been simmering in the Middle East since 1948, stoked from within Jordan as well as the 
regional and international involvement of Jordan’s neighbors, the United Kingdom, and 
United States, would send the Middle East to a boiling point. Jordan’s losses, the West 
Bank, Jerusalem, and its gains, 250,000 more Palestinian refugees, would cause the shift 
in policies from inclusionary to exclusionary. The denial of their rights the new wave of 
Palestinian refugees would endure will no longer exist as an effect of discrimination but 
as implemented, state sanctioned human rights abuse.  
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The Six – Day War: Beginning of Jordan’s Political Exclusion 
 The Six-Day-War, fought between Israel, Egypt, Syria and Jordan from June 5th  
to June 10th, 1967, drastically changed how Palestinian refugees are treated in Jordan. 
The Six-Day-War was the culmination of all the regional tensions that have been 
worsening between Israel and its Arab neighbors since the Arab-Israeli War in 1948130.  
As discussed in the previous chapter, relations between Jordan and Israel never 
normalized after 1948, instead deteriorating with every guerilla attack by the Palestinian 
Fedayeen, and every disproportionately violent Israeli retaliation.   
 On a regional scale, Israel was also responding to Egyptian,  Jordanian, and Iraqi 
military preparations, the closing of the Strait of Tiran by Egypt, and several other 
instigators. The Israeli military launched a series of preemptive strikes against its 
neighbors, almost destroying each country’s military capabilities and conquering all of 
the West Bank, Gaza Strip, Sinai Peninsula, and Golan Heights131.  
 The Six-Day-War resulted in the displacement of more than 300,000 refugees, 
approximately half of which fled from UNRWA camps from within the West Bank. 
These twice displaced refugees were joined by more than 125,000 Palestinians that fled 
from destroyed villages and homes.  Lebanon and Syria closed their borders as soon as 
Palestinians started to flee, forcing the Palestinians, leaving Jordan as the nation of 
refuge.  
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 Jordan’s annexation of the West Bank complicated the categorizations of the new 
1967 refugees. Amongst them, only 10% were Jordanians of Palestinian origin, and were 
primarily migrant workers in the gulf who traveled in between the West Bank and gulf 
states for work132. Over half were Palestinian refugees of 1948 who had been living in 
UNRWA camps in cities like Nablus and Hebron133. These refugees had not accepted the 
offer of Jordanian citizenship and now were twice- displaced. Set apart from these two 
groups were the new refugees of 1967, who comprised of approximately 35% of the 1967 
exodus. The majority of these refugees were fellahin, farmers who saw no need to travel 
to Amman and claim Jordanian citizenship. Even though these refugees migrated 
internally from the East Bank to the West (as Jordan did relinquished its political claim 
on the West Bank until the 1970s), these Palestinians did not have citizenship. There 
were also approximately 50,000 Jordanians of Palestinian origin still living in the West 
Bank, who chose not to flee in the 1967 war, yet another complicating category as Jordan 
attempts to recover in the face of yet another influx of refugees.  
With a precedent set in place from Jordan in 1948, the refugees fleeing to the East 
Bank now needed assistance, Jordan was now  left to define and provide for not only an 
old refugee population 750,000 Palestinians in 1948, but 300,000 more. The Jordanian 
state also needed to decide how to respond to the Jordanians of Palestinian origin left 
behind in what was now “occupied Palestine”. Now that the West Bank was occupied, 
did these Jordanians of Palestinian origin technically have a “right to return” to Jordan?  
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Like the refugees of 1948 that fled to Jordan only to find they could not return to 
their homes, the Palestinian refugees of 1967 experienced a similar predicament, 
prevented from returning to the West Bank by the Israeli Defense Forces with the same 
“Prevention of Infiltration Law”134. The Israeli settlements (which were mostly military 
outposts) began to grow in number following the occupation of the West Bank to solidify 
Israel’s control over the area. Just as in 1948, the political rights of the Palestinians to 
return their homes following the end of the conflict was ignored by the international 
community. Even the 1967 protocol relating to the status of the refugee, which was 
signed by countries such as the United States and the U.K in October of 1967, after the 
conflict, excluded Palestinians. The 1967 protocol widened the 1951 definition of a 
refugee, now longer limited to European refugees after WWII. However, this protocol 
made no move to allow Palestinians to fall under the UNHCR mandate.  There were no 
edits to UNRWA’s mandate between 1948 – 1967 that included the political rights of the 
Palestinians.  Without the protection of the UNHCR or changes made to UNRWA’s 
mandate, the Palestinians of 1967 were left homeless, and stateless, much like their 1948 
counterparts.  
Unsurprisingly, the international community sympathized with the displacement 
of 300,000, and disapproved of the sharp increase in number of Israeli settlements, but 
didn’t protect the political rights of the Palestinians with anything more than political 
posturing. The Security Council’s adopted a resolution (resolution 242) following the six-
day-war which called on the government of Israel to “to ensure the safety, welfare and 
security of the inhabitants of the areas where military operations had taken place and to 
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facilitate the return of those that had fled” without ever enforcing the actual return of any 
refugees135. It also called on Israel to make reparations to UNRWA for “damage, death 
and injury caused to Agency property and personnel as a result of the hostilities”136. The 
total cost of damage to UNRWA’s workers equaled more than $2.4 million in today’s 
dollar. These reparations were also never enforced.  
The United States’ reaction to the Six-Day-War was largely reflective of the Cold 
War Politics at the time. The United States had spent the last ten years financially 
supporting countries like Jordan, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia in order to maintain their 
positions as loyal client states, but when Egypt began entertaining a relationship with the 
Soviets, the United States turned towards Israel to maintain a “balance of power”, gifting 
Israel with a series of fighter planes that would be used in Israel’s preemptive strike on 
Egypt137. During the six days of actual fighting, Israeli forces attacked the USS Liberty a 
United States intelligence ship in the region, killing more than 30 Americans 138. The 
Israeli explanation for the attack was that the ship was mistakenly identified as Al-Kasir, 
one of Egypt’s ships139. With this explanation in mind, the literature surrounding this 
event explores the possibility that the attack on the USS Liberty was an intentional act to 
prevent U.S. monitoring of Israeli military actions140. Whatever the motive, the Israeli 
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government apologized and charged several naval officers, including the Acting Chief of 
Naval Operations for three counts of negligence, and the United States took no further 
action141.  
During the aftermath of the Six-Day-War, it was important for the Johnson 
administration to maintain the strongest allies possible. Since Jordan and Syria, two of 
the United States’ allies were crippled by the six day war, the Johnson administration 
decided to proceed with its support and strengthening of the Israeli state, while also 
financially supporting Jordan and Syria142.  Johnson ordered his Joint Chiefs of Staff to 
do a study on the six-day-war to determine what territory was needed to survive as a 
nation. Following this study, the Israeli government was advised to hold on to whatever 
territories they had gained: the Gaza Strip, mountains and plateaus of the West Bank, the 
tip of the Sinai, Sharm El-Sheikh, the Golan Heights east of Quneitra and all of 
Jerusalem143.  
The security of America’s allies was the primary concern of the United States, the 
rights of the Palestinians were ultimately ignored in these decision-making processes . 
Even though the United States, like the rest of the international community, disapproved 
of settlements and the occupation of the West Bank, these fell to the wayside to make 
room for the security of U.S. interests in the Middle East.  
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 The Six-Day-War severely set – back Jordan’s fluctuating economy. The Six-
Day-War destroyed much of Jordan’s military capabilities, which they had been building 
with help from the U.S. and U.K. since 1948144. They also lost the West Bank, which 
meant they lost any agricultural profit from the area. While much of Jordan industrial 
development and urbanization occurred in the East Bank, the 1/3 of the development 
budget allocated to the West Bank, was spent on agriculture145.  The development in the 
East Bank lacked this agricultural leaning, focusing instead on phosphate mining, 
factories, and urbanization. Prior to the war, the West Bank produced a surplus of fruits 
and vegetables which accounted for more than 30% of Jordan’s GDP.  
The loss of the West Bank was a huge blow to the tourism sector. 55% of tourists 
traveling to Jordan went to the West Bank to see Jerusalem as well and other religiously 
significant cities such as Nazareth and Bethlehem146. In 1968, this amounted to a loss of 
$24 million in revenue at the time, which amounts to almost $163 million in 2015147. The 
Six-Day-War and the resulting losses now meant Jordan had to rebuild its military, find 
ways to import food as well as support the needs of the 300,000 refugees in the West 
Bank alongside any Palestinian migrants now in Jordan.  
Considering how the Palestinians brought instability to the Jordanian economy in 
1948, the Jordanian population was cautious of yet another wave of Palestinian refugees, 
and resentful that they had to shoulder the responsibility yet again148. Spurred on by 
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Abdel Nasser’s angry defeatism, the Jordanians also blamed the United States and 
Europe for supporting Israel and therefore crushing an Arab victory. King Hussein, who 
had actually previously advised Egypt and Syria against underestimating Israel’s military 
might, actually rose in popularity as Jordanians blamed the United States, Israel, and 
Egypt for the worsening economic tides. 
King Hussein assured the Jordanians that the newly arriving Palestinians would 
be able to return home soon. He validated his claims by keeping the two bridges open and 
advocating for the “unity of the two banks”149. Predicting the economic losses that were 
sure to come if he lost the West Bank, King Hussein pressed the Arab League, the United 
States, and delegates from the United Nations to return the West Bank to Jordan. It made 
sense, he argued, because almost all of the Palestinians in the West Bank had Jordanian 
citizenship anyway150. King Hussein even visited the United States in late June after 
addressing the U.N., offering peace with Israel if the West Bank was returned. President 
Johnson was largely uninterested in who possessed the left bank, and left the situation 
open for direct negotiation with Israel, an option that left King Hussein unsatisfied151.  
The Palestinians, particularly the more organized members of the Palestinian 
Liberation Organization (PLO), were advocating for a separate Palestinian state. The fact 
that King Hussein’s goals directly opposed the Palestinians desire for self-determination 
was only another reason King Hussein lost so much support amongst Jordanians of 
Palestinian origin and Palestinian refugees. The PLO-Jordanian conflict over Palestinian 
representation first reached the political sphere during the Al-Khartoum Arab Summit in 
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August, 1967. Al-Shuqairi, the PLO leader at the time, also thinking that the Israeli 
occupation would not last long, requested that Palestine be given the right of self-
determination, and not to return to Jordanian rule. He continued to claim that the PLO 
was the sole, legitimate representative of the Palestinian people.  
Unlike Nasser, who incited public outcry over the results of the six-day-war,  
King Hussein took a moderate approach toward the Jordan-Israeli conflict, realizing 
(through his state visits to Western countries) that Israel’s existence was a reality that had 
to be accepted. He was rational in his approach, trying to convince the Arab leaders 
during the Al-Khartoum summit to exert all efforts, including diplomatic ones, in an 
endeavor to secure the restoration of the West Bank Arab lands to Jordan. The Arab 
League decided at the Al-Khartoum conference to support King Hussein’s endeavors to 
reclaim the West Bank. The United Nations Resolution 242 was received with varying 
reactions within the Arab World. While accepted by both Jordan and Egypt, it was 
rejected by Syria and the PLO, because it did not make any mention of a Palestinian state.  
For the Palestinians, the situation following 1967 would only be an exacerbated 
replay of 1948. Palestinians relied on UNRWA for services, and UNRWA was struggling 
now more than ever. UNRWA dealt with not only the 750,000 refugees which fled in 
1948, but now was responsible for the children of those 750,000 and for the lives of 
300,000 more. In 1967, ten more camps were in Jordan to shelter the 300,000 refugees152.  
Each year, UNRWA would ask for more funding to fulfill the needs of the quickly 
growing Palestinian population. There was an immediate need, but a dearth of resources.  
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Both King Hussein and UNRWA needed a solution, because the number of 
refugees had simply become too large for the Jordanian infrastructure. King Hussein’s 
solution was a redefining of a “Palestinian refugee”153. An amendment to Additional Law 
No. 56, which granted Palestinians citizenship, limited the citizenship to refugees of the 
1948 exodus only. Furthermore, it defined a Palestinian refugee as a “Palestinian fleeing 
from their home as a result of the June War”. This definition makes all refugees which 
fled in 1948 full-fledged Jordanians.  
UNRWA underwent a similar redefining process in 1968, changing the mandate 
to include refugees from 1967. However, because of the finalization of the Jordanian 
nationalization process, the Palestinians who had fled in 1948 were technically no longer 
refugees. This only left UNRWA to care for the refugees who had fled because of the 
Six-Day-War, but left many “Jordanians of Palestinian Origin” impoverished and without 
services.  
By annexing the West Bank in 1948 and offering citizenship to Palestinian 
refugees, Jordan had set a precedent that no native Jordanian was willing to follow. The 
international community expected that the refugees of 1967  would be offered the same 
citizenship that the refugees of 1948 were offered; this never occurred. The growth in 
tensions between Palestinians and Jordanians, as well as near economic collapse, caused 
King Hussein to worry about the security of his regime once again. In the face of these 
threats, the integration experiment would not be repeated. The Six-Day-War marked the 
beginning of King Hussein’s shift towards exclusionary policies, and decades of suffering 
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that the Palestinians would endure as a result due to discrimination, lack of services, and 
abuse. 
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The Politics of Exclusion 
Since its independence in 1946, Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan has lasted 
numerous wars, has absorbed more than three million refugees, had fought in two wars, 
had absorbed more than one million Palestinian refugees, and has survived despite having 
almost no arable, livable land, and no economic viability. The resiliency of Jordan’s 
Hashemite monarchy, disliked and threatened by every bordering nation, should be 
acknowledged. In the face of both internal and regional tensions, King Hussein’s political 
instincts talent at assuaging the Jordanian population and engaging the United State’s 
support should be acknowledged.  
 Following the 1967 war, Hussein and Parliament were faced with a series of 
questions that needed to be answered quickly: with Palestine under occupation, did 
Palestinian refugees in the West Bank keep their Jordanian citizenship, and were the 
refugees of 1967 given citizenship?  
Policies were not changed right after the six – day- war, partly because King Hussein was 
still hedging for the reunification of the West Bank. Following 1948, there was 
continuous economic migration of Palestinian refugees from the West Bank to the East 
Bank in search of employment. Furthermore, the 800,000154 Palestinians who lived in the 
West Bank prior to 1948, and who did not flee during the 1948 war, offered Jordanian 
citizenship. These Palestinian / Jordanian citizens who weren’t refugees also had the 
opportunity to migrate to the more industrialized cities of the East Bank.  
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 Through the unification of the West Bank and East Bank, a possibility still existed 
that the 300,000 Palestinian refugees of 1967 could return to their homes. When it 
became clear that the refugees of 1967 would be unable to return home, much like the 
refugees of 1948, native Jordanians, rich and poor alike, considered the Palestinian 
refugees an infrastructural burden155. By 1967, the tensions between Jordanians of 
Palestinian origin and Jordanians regarding access to work and services was of large 
concern to King Hussein. Poor Jordanians were an important constituency because of the 
sway they held over the tribal leaders who Hussein needed to maintain control over his 
Kingdom156.  
 Almost all of the refugees that fled to the West Bank in 1948 were automatically 
offered citizenship in 1948. However, unless a Palestinian traveled to the Ministry of 
Interior in Amman, they were unable to claim their Jordanian citizenship157. Nearly one 
million Palestinians in West Bank did not take Jordanian citizenship when offered158. The 
average Palestinian refugee in 1948 believed that accepting the Jordanian citizenship 
would prevent their right to return to their ancestral homes, and held that belief into the 
1960s159 . Approximately 400,000 refugees in the East Bank did not take Jordanian 
citizenship for similar reasons160. National Palestinians - who were not refugees  - either 
migrated to the East Bank and became “Jordanians of Palestinian origins” or chose to 
stay with their homes in the West Bank. The Palestinian fellahin who chose saw no 
economic benefit in migrating to the East Bank. The Palestinians that did migrate, 
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refugees or not, could still migrate in between the East and West Banks with relative ease 
(compared to today). Post 1967, the citizenship status of Jordanians of Palestinian origin, 
whether they were originally refugees or not, remained the same.  
 UNRWA remained an important source of aid and relief to the Palestinian 
refugees in 1967, but UNRWA in the East Bank was under the financial pressure to 
support more than 300,000 more refugees161. Despite numerous funding appeals to the 
United Nation, and claiming that their financial situation in 1968 was “more alarming 
than ever before”. In 1968, four new “emergency camps” had to be created to sustain the 
300,000 new Palestinian refugees, creating a new set of expenses amongst continuing 
budget restraints. From the years 1963-1967, annual spending by UNRWA increased by 
$2.5 each year. Furthermore, numerous donors fail to commit to their donor pledges, 
leaving UNRWA shortchanged by an average of 8 million each year from 1960-1967.  
UNRWA lost 9.6 million dollars in donor pledges in 1967-1968 alone162.  
 UNRWA’s financial stress worked well for King Hussein, who made one 
important change to citizen policy. The amendment to Additional Law No. 56, made in 
November of 1967, limited the offer of Jordanian citizenship to the Palestinians that 
accepted it from 1948-1966. This automatically excluded any of the 300,000+ refugees 
fleeing from the East Bank from applying for the citizenship they were entitled to under 
Law No. 56. This change also meant that any Palestinian who did not have a citizenship 
number was unable to get one after 1967, refugee or not. Ultimately, it is one’s 
citizenship status which affected what Jordanian services a person had access to, as well 
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as how UNRWA serviced both refugees from 1948 and 1967, with an adverse effect on 
Palestinian employment, literacy, and healthcare outcomes.  
 Though the change in citizenship policy from inclusionary to exclusionary would 
benefit UNRWA, King Hussein advocated this change in policy for his own reasons. The 
Jordanian private sector had already been saturated for years, and the unemployment rate 
fluctuated between 7-12% between 1950-1967. The 1967 war led to a rise in 
unemployment from 7% to 15% in 1968163. Jordan’s only saving grace was its donors: 
the United States, UNRWA and the Arab League. The U.S., Jordan’s largest donor gave 
58.9 million in the form of aid, and over 20 million in “technical assistance” which 
included infrastructural improvements to Jordan’s intelligence agencies and military164. 
In total, U.S. donations and assistance amounted for 52.9% of Jordan’s entire GDP165. 
Arab donations from Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and the UAE totaled approximately 7% of 
Jordan’s GDP166. The United States’ foreign policy is a major influence in King 
Hussein’s regional political decisions, and it is crucial for the economic viability of 
Jordan that King Hussein falls in line. The Hashemites have angered poor Jordanians 
many times by following United States’ foreign policy motives, such when Jordan and 
Israel signed peace accords in the 1970s.  Without the United States’ support, the 
Hashemites and the Jordanian state would not have survived.  
The aid given to King Hussein was used to maintain and gain loyalty any way he 
could. Very little of the aid Jordan received went into the private sector, where the 
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majority of Jordan’s industrialization had occurred in the 1950s. Instead, the majority of 
financial aid went to strengthening the public sector, from rebuilding Jordan’s military to 
improving the infrastructure of Jordanian ministries167. The average Jordanian could not 
work in the public sector, as positions within the ministries were awarded to other 
Hashemites and Bedouin tribesleaders in exchange for loyalty. The Bedouins leaders of 
the South were King Hussein’s most important constituents, since they were the best 
fighters and formed a large part of Jordan’s military leadership168.  
 After an attempted coup d’etat in 1958, the loyalty of the Jordanian military was 
more important to King Hussein than ever. The investment in the public sector, which 
also included the creation of Jordan’s first public university (the University of Jordan) 
and several hospitals, also benefited the Hashemites and those loyal to the regime. 
Anyone who worked for the state of Jordan in the public sector was able to utilize these 
services at a subsidized cost169.   
 The tightening of the definition of citizenship is important because it redefines 
who UNRWA serves. In June of 1967 Resolution 2252 was passed by the General 
Assembly to “continue to provide humanitarian assistance… on an emergency basis, and 
as a temporary measure, to persons in the area who are currently displaced and in serious 
need of continued assistance”170. It was clear UNRWA workers that though UNRWA 
was renewed as a temporary mandate yet again, UNRWA’s advisory committee 
understood that this mandate UNRWA’s presence in Jordan could continue for several 
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more years171. This lack of funding was the reason for the shift in UNRWA’s specificity: 
which refugees they helped and to what capacity.  
 Until 1968, UNRWA serviced a large population of “Jordanians of Palestinian 
origin”, refugees of 1948 who had taken Jordanian citizenship but still utilized UNRWA 
schools, clinics and work programs due to difficulties gaining employment the Jordanian 
private sector172. The Jordanians of Palestinian origin had access to Jordanian services by 
law, though they had trouble paying for educational entry fees or healthcare services173. 
Dr. Subhi Amr, leader of the UNRWA’s advisory committee wrote in a letter to the 
commissioner –general in 1968, that “strict adherence to UNRWA’s mandate should 
compel Jordan to improve its services for the benefit of all citizens”174.  
By strictly following the mandate, the UNRWA advisory committee hoped that 
Jordan could use its own funds to provide for the Jordanians of Palestinian origin, and 
UNRWA could focus on the refugees without Jordanian documentation, both from 1948 
and 1967. UNRWA’s changes to its mandate only helped so much, as the number of 
refugees living in the East Bank ballooned after the Six-Day-War. In fact, in 1968 the 
number of registered refugees UNRWA served in the East Bank (taking into account 
these new restrictions) increased by 125,000175.   
While the change to the law itself was not protested in Jordan, its ramifications 
across Jordan caused discontent amongst the Jordanians of Palestinian origin and served 
and caused even greater tension between the Jordanians of Palestinian origins and native 
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Jordanians. The full ramifications of this one simple change in policy were huge when 
applied to the the operations of the Ministries of Interior, Labor, Education, and Health. 
In essence, the amendments to Law No. 56 accomplished the political barring of both 
refugees from 1948 and 1967 from ever integrating into Jordan. This law, and its 
subsequent implementation  paved a path of systemic discrimination of Jordanians of 
Palestinian origin, who, no longer served by UNRWA, fell through the cracks.  
Regulations of Citizenship   
 It is crucial to understand that the true determinants of access are within Jordan’s 
bureaucracies. In order to participate in Jordanian life at all, one has to be a citizen. 
Citizenship is proved under No. 56 by a person’s “citizenship number” and their passport. 
These two forms of documentation are required in order to go to a Jordanian school and 
university, to to visit a Jordanian hospital or even to work. These identifiers are 
distributed by the Ministry of Interior (MoI) and the Ministry of Residency (MoR). 
Without them, a refugee cannot own property or work legally without paying exorbitant 
“guest” fees. Both the MoI and MoR created a specific set of taxes and stipulations that 
are required of “foreigners” living in Jordan. These stipulations apply to each “foreign” 
non-governmental organization and inter-governmental organization as well as any 
refugee living in the urban environment (such as the city of Amman) without a 
citizenship number or passport.  
 Other regulations make it nearly impossible for refugees to live and work in 
Jordan legally. For example, Jordan’s document renewal process, managed by the MoR 
automatically puts Jordanians of Palestinian Origin at a disadvantage. Jordanians of 
Palestinian origins are not immediately given Jordanian passports, instead, they are given 
two-year travel documents. Two-year travel documents require the recipient to leave the 
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country and return in order to renew a visa. Since Palestinians were not allowed to enter 
Lebanon, Syria or Saudi Arabia without great difficulty, many were forced to travel to 
and from the West Bank. With the West Bank now under occupation, many Jordanians of 
Palestinian origin were unable to re-enter the West Bank due to Israel’s infiltration laws, 
which had been in effect since 1954.  
 Jordanians of Palestinian origin unable to renew their two-year travel documents 
could get their citizenship revoked, even if they already had a citizenship number176. 
Even though a Jordanians of Palestinian origin can become a citizen once they have lived 
in Jordan for five years, but if they cannot show proof of residency (through a travel 
document) they can be subject to a fine for each day they lived in Jordan “illegally”. This 
fine, administered by the MoI, is another barrier to many Palestinians’ integration into 
Jordan. It is estimated by UNRWA field-workers that at least 40,000 Jordanians of 
Palestinian origin who had been “granted” citizenship in 1948 were actually denied their 
citizenship based on these regulations177.  
 The implementation of the amendments passed in 1967 was tasked to the 
ministries without any oversight. Positions of authority within the ministries were given 
to loyal Hashemites and tribal leaders, who then used these positions to institute a 
bureaucratic culture of corruption. Whether Palestinian or Jordanian, it is impossible to 
navigate these bureaucracies without wastah, important connections that bear political 
significance178. The nepotism prevalent throughout these ministries, allowed by a lack of 
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checks and balances and King Hussein’s willingness to look the other way to maintain 
loyalty, makes these bureaucracies a nightmare to Palestinians to this day. Submitting 
information, requests, and payments through proper channels in no way guarantees a 
result; instead, friendships and family connections are the only way to achieve a desired 
outcome, whether that be the renewal of a passport or a certification of a citizenship 
number. Palestinians, who often lacked connections amongst the upper class Hashemites, 
were unable to penetrate this system.  
The regulations implemented by the MoI and MoR succeeded in segmenting the 
refugee population which had existed from 1948 to 1967, into several categories, each 
with differing rights to services. There were refugees of 1948 who had become full-
fledged Jordanians of Palestinian origin: these former refugees no longer had access to 
services from UNRWA. Then, following these new Jordanians, there were refugees from 
1948 who had never claimed their Jordanian citizenship, as well as the refugees of 1967. 
Due to the amendments to Additional Law No. 56, these Palestinians and their 
descendants will never become citizens of Jordan.  
Lastly, the Jordanians of Palestinian origin who had somehow had their 
citizenship revoked were now stateless, and could not legally work because they had lost 
citizenship. They still had the opportunity to regain citizenship by navigating their way 
through Jordan’s tangled bureaucracies, though this was rarely successful179 . Ultimately, 
the latter two groups would become the most vulnerable population of Palestinians in 
Jordan, denied both their political and social economic rights by the Jordanian 
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government, instead forced to the outskirts to be either abused, or ignored as much as 
possible by the Hashemites as well as native Jordanians.  
Work 
 This application of Law No. 56 limits the mobility of any refugee, either from 
1948 or 1967 and makes them easy to exploit. Neither Palestinians of 1948 or 1967 were 
able to work legally under these purposefully difficult regulations. This creates an 
estimated 1,000,000 refugees that are unable to enter the Jordanian private job market 
because they cannot pay the “guest fees” and it is illegal to work otherwise180. A culture 
of abuse quickly took shape, with Palestinians paid unfair wages and forced to live in 
subpar living conditions. This was particularly true in the phosphate mining industry, 
where the majority of the workers were Palestinian and suffered the health consequences 
of working in unsafe conditions181. The parts of cities most heavily populated by 
Palestinians were shanty towns on the edges of Amman and Al-Zarqa, often made out of 
zinc, which UNRWA and the World Health Organization would later uncover as a public 
health concern as well an abuse of human rights182.  
 Jordan’s unemployment rate in 1968 (15%) affected all Jordanians, but 
disproportionately affected the Jordanians of Palestinian origin. Of Jordan’s unemployed 
population in 1968, more than 80% were Jordanians of Palestinian origin183. The 
unemployment of professional youth was growing into a considerable problem. Many 
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Jordanians of Palestinian origin graduating from universities were unable to find suitable 
positions of management or leadership in private sector, with the public sector nearly 
impenetrable to the low and middle class Palestinians completely, regardless of one’s 
academic status184. The unemployment of educated Jordanians of Palestinian origins 
would become a significant instigator of tensions between native Jordanians and 
Palestinian Jordanians and contributed to the rapid growth of the Palestinian national 
movement following the Six-Day-War185.  
 Though UNRWA employed approximately 12,000 Palestinian refugees as 
teachers, healthcare providers, and other local-field staff, there weren’t nearly enough 
employment opportunities to provide for more than 800,000 refugees living in Jordan in 
1968186. UNRWA created several infrastructural projects, including home-building, 
sewage installation, and life-training to employ the refugees living in the 10 camps 
scattered throughout Jordan. Concrete housing replacing tarp tents, and new schools were 
built to accommodate new students187. Together, these projects temporarily employed 
about 8,000 more Palestinians in 1968188 However, these projects could only provide 
employment for so long, especially as UNRWA’s funds continued to decrease. As 
UNRWA projects ended, since it was impossible for any Palestinian refugees to gain 
citizenship after 1967, they were unable to find legal work even when qualified to do so.  
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Education 
1950-1967 were years of significant educational growth for Jordan. The 
Education reform law, passed in 1952 and pushed forward by King Abdullah I, declared 
education as a human right for all Jordanian citizens. A subsequent law passed in 1955, 
the Education Law No. 20, stipulates granting the opportunity for all Jordan’s people 
through subsidies and free primary education (the first six years of schooling). Education 
Law No. 20 also states an emphasis on “value oriented” education and health 
education189. King Hussein intended “Value oriented” education to form a younger 
generation that is aware of its duties towards God, the Nation, and at the same time open 
towards the Arab world and global thought190.  
 Up until the Six-Day-War, educational reform had been focused on the 
centralization of Jordanian education. Additional educational reform, such as Education 
Law No. 13 and 16 both passed in 1964. Education Law No. 13 made primary education 
compulsory for all Jordanians citizens. Law No. 16’s goal was to eradicate illiteracy. It 
made nine years of education mandatory, and aimed to link long term secondary 
education reform to the needs of Jordanian society. Law No. 16 also mandated the 
Ministry of Education to establish reforms address quality issues amongst headmasters, 
students, teachers and curricula.   
 Like the majority of Jordanian policies, the actual implementation of these 
projects was borne out through its ministries. The Ministry of Culture and Youth 
(MoCY), a new ministry created by Law No. 16, and the Ministry of Education (MoE) 
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worked together to attempt to engage the young Jordanian population as well as well as 
expand Jordan’s centralized educational system191. Following the ratification of these 
laws, the need for schools and teachers skyrocketed. Law No. 13, which made primary 
education compulsory is credited for adding approximately 600,000 students (both native 
Jordanians and Jordanians of Palestinian origin) to the educational system. 
 Laws No. 13 and 16, placed Ministry of Education in charge of building primary 
and secondary schools and appointing new teachers. Since Law No. 16 aimed to make 
nine years of education compulsory and free for Jordanian citizens, there was a quick 
decrease in illiteracy rates to King Hussein192. Educational reform was also impeded by 
decentralized administration in education and lack of structure regarding curriculums193. 
In attempts to establish educational infrastructure in the form of schools, a uniform 
curriculum was not fully established.   
While Jordan’s focus on education improvements continued following the 
disruption of the Six – Day – War, the percentage of Jordan’s budget allotted to education 
were insufficient in meeting the needs educational reform created. In 1968, Jordan’s  
budget for education, healthcare and other public works projects decreased by 6.2% in 
order to fund King Hussein’s army, despite his promises for more service reform194.  
In the face of these budget cuts, the MoE and MoCY made changes to the 
curriculum in order to benefit from the breakdown in primary vs. secondary education. 
While primary education is free for Jordanian citizens, public secondary education is 
available for an annual school fee. In 1968, the MoE implemented a regulation which 
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shortened the years of primary education from six years to five195. This increases the 
number of years a student spends, and therefore must pay for, in secondary school.  
This regulation discriminately affected Jordanians of Palestinian origin. 
Compared to native Jordanians, Jordanians of Palestinian origin were more likely unable 
to afford secondary education fees196. Even though the Ministry of Education provided 
subsidies for poorer Jordanians, they were only distributed to families who “have lived in 
Jordan for more than twenty years”197. This automatically rules out many Jordanians of 
Palestinian origin, from receiving any education subsidies at all. While some of this 
decrease in students could be attributed to the opening of several private schools serving 
upper-class Jordanians, it is clear that the majority of students were unable to complete 
their secondary education due to the cost.  
UNRWA’s educational infrastructure grew following the six-day-war despite a 
continual need for funds. The six-day-war and the resulting 1967 created a need for 
further educational services: In 1968 UNRWA schools had 64,300 students enrolled, as 
opposed to 54,700 students that were enrolled in 1967198. Because of the sudden increase 
in number of students, 12,000 of these students were taught in tents and other temporary 
structures.  Starting in 1968, UNRWA expanded multiple vocational and training 
programs particularly for teaching, so that refugees in 1967 could work and contribute to 
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the camp’s environment.199 These training programs also provided vocational programs 
for women, and UNRWA hired an additional 250 female teachers in 1968 alone200.  
In order for refugees to integrate into higher education systems in their host 
nations, UNRWA’s curriculum in Jordan was matched with that of the Jordanian public 
schools. However, comparative analytics compiled by United Nations and the Jordanian 
government have shown that UNRWA students consistently performed better than their 
Jordanian counterparts. Though the curriculums are the same, in terms of both attendance 
and testing, UNRWA students, Palestinian refugees, appeared to be receiving the better 
education and became a source of contention between Jordanians and Palestinians201 .  
One quality indicator which showed this variation in quality were the 
tawjeehin202. The tawjeehin is cumulative examination which ultimately determines 
which course of study a student can apply for in the universities.  As early as 1970, 
UNRWA students scored about 100 points higher on their tawjeehin than Jordanian (both 
Jordanian of Palestinian origin and native Jordanian) students203. A study conducted by 
the MoE in 1972 showed that UNRWA students’ scores were one fifth of a standard 
deviation higher than the scores of Jordanian students204. Because tawjeehin scores 
determine which careers students can enter, higher tawjeehin scores imply that UNRWA 
students were more eligible for “higher level” careers, particularly in the sciences and 
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public service205. UNRWA students showed a significant performance advantage, despite 
a resource-constrained education administration and the various sources of adversity 
affecting both students and teachers – who as refugees, often suffered disproportionate 
physical, emotional and psychological disadvantages206.  
 Many studies have attempted to understand the success of UNRWA schools 
compared to public schools, the majority of the analysis contributes UNRWA’s success 
to teacher satisfaction, greater administrative support for teachers and management, better 
recruitment strategies, mandated focus on professional development, and a greater sense 
of responsibility regarding student outcomes207.  
 The Ministry of Education struggled to make Jordan’s public schools as 
competitive as UNRWA, creating an intense focus on examination preparations. 
However UNRWA continued to best the Ministry of Education in tawjeehin scores and 
public university admittances. The continuing variance could be attributed to hiring bias. 
UNRWA has a more formal hiring process; preference is given to skilled or trained 
refugees who are hired by UNRWA’s supervisors, the majority of which were European 
or American. Because of this, UNRWA is supposedly less susceptible to the wastah, 
nepotism, or bribery that is prevalent in the MoE’s hiring practices.  
 Since UNRWA’s students were more qualified than Jordanian public school 
students for the top university spots, the MoE needed to create further opportunities for 
Jordanian public students. While private preparatory high schools were ratified by the 
MoE to create more competitive students, these schools were too expensive for the 
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average Jordanian208. The MoE ultimately created more spots for Jordanian students by 
implementing barriers which prevented many UNRWA students from attending Jordan’s 
universities. Under an amendment to Education Law No. 18, a student must show “proof 
of residency” meaning, to pay the large fine to live outside of the refugee camps209. A 
student must also have a current passport, which rules out the stateless Palestinian 
refugees. These stipulations also affected Jordanians of Palestinian origin without the 
proper documentation, such as a passport.  
 The MoE also instituted financial restraints to limit the participation of UNRWA 
students, and by extension, many Jordanians of Palestinian origin lacking documentation. 
An Amendment to Education Law No. 20 allows for the MoE to determine how 
international students should be accepted into Jordanian universities. The MoE decided 
that all “guest students”, meaning students without a citizenship number and Jordanian 
passport, may attend Jordanian universities if a “guest student tuition” is paid. This 
“guest student tuition” in 1970, was four times more expensive than the “Jordanian 
student tuition210. The “guest student tuition” barred the majority of Palestinian refugees 
from entering Jordan’s higher education system. UNRWA could only provide 
scholarships for a few hundred Palestinian students, due to funding constraints211. After 
1967 and the resulting changes in citizenship policy, UNRWA subsidies were not enough 
to pay the high price of “guest tuition”. The refugees, who were not allowed to work 
legally, were unable to cover even a fraction of the cost.  
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Healthcare   
 Much like education, access to healthcare was limited primarily through 
regulations by the Ministry of Health (MoH), and these regulations were contingent on a 
person’s citizenship. Without citizenship, though a person isn’t automatically impeded 
for healthcare services, the high cost of care is enough to impede both Palestinian 
Refugees and Jordanians of Palestinian origin from getting the healthcare they need.  
 Prior to 1967, UNRWA’s healthcare system and the Jordanian hospital systems 
were linked. UNRWA clinics would provide primary services and healthcare education to 
Palestinian refugees as well as Jordanians of Palestinian origin. If needed, UNRWA 
would send Palestinian patients to both public and private Jordanian hospitals, where they 
would be treated for their more advanced illnesses. Each year, UNRWA would give each 
Jordanian hospital a lump sum that hospital could use to cover the cost of those patients’ 
cases212.  
 Jordan’s healthcare capacity increased rapidly from the years 1950 to 1967, in 
order to address greater needs in capacity. The Jordanian government built public 
hospitals and funded private hospitals. The Jordanian military funded the expansion of its 
Royal Medical Service, (RMS) an operated branch of public health services. The 
Ministry of Health funded the implementation of public health law No. 43, to provide 
preventative health education services.  
Unlike Jordan’s educational system, which began centralized, Jordan’s healthcare 
resources were divided amongst the private system, the hospital system and the RMS. 
The private hospitals were primarily operated by missionary groups, both Muslim and 
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Christian. They charge a fee per service, but provide services if a patient cannot pay. 
Since the first Palestinian refugee crisis, many of these hospitals partnered with UNRWA 
to provide services to Palestinian refugees. Public hospitals, operated by the Jordanian 
government, also contracted with UNRWA, but could not provide free services. The six-
day-war resulted in a shift away from health services, despite an increase in the increase 
in need caused by the arrival of the Palestinian refugees in 1967. The need to contain 
costs created a need for change in payment processes that the hospitals underwent in the 
1970s.   
 The Ministry of Health’s restrictive regulations were based on citizenship, much 
like the restrictions in education. The amendment to Health Law No 1. In 1969 allows for 
the Ministry of Health to place a higher price on services for “guests” of the country213. 
This means that refugees, without Jordanian citizenship, who need inpatient services have 
to pay a much higher price than Jordanians, who can receive subsidies from the MoH.  
 Because of this new implementation, UNRWA needs to pay four times as much 
for a refugee’s secondary healthcare services: services such as surgery, recovery and 
medications. Like its other services, following the six-day-war UNRWA limited its 
services to Palestinian refugees with documentation, excluding Jordanians of Palestinian 
origin from their clinics. If Jordanians of Palestinian origin could not prove their 
citizenship to the Ministry of Interior or Ministry of Labor, they are just as easily barred 
from healthcare services as a Palestinian refugee would be214. 
 By 1972, UNRWA would no longer have the capacity to send refugees to public 
hospitals at all. Instead, UNRWA switched to a “health care voucher” system. In this new 
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system, UNRWA gives an annual voucher to each family for the use of healthcare 
services. While these funds are meant to supply a whole family with medications or 
treatments for a year, more often than not these funds were not enough to cover necessary 
services, causing refugees to choose to deny themselves needed care215.  
Policies Effect on Health Outcomes:  
 Morbidity measures like disease prevalence and mortality can provide a reference 
for which to determine these policies affects on a refugee’s health. Disease incidence is 
defined as the portion of a population newly diagnosed with a condition216, such as heart 
disease or diabetes. While the disease incidence portrays the penetration of a disease in a 
population, the mortality rate indicates the likelihood a patient will die from that 
illness217.  
Fleeing refugees are likely to face disruptions in healthcare services. However, 
when provided access to services, these morbidity rates should improve: which is to say, 
any care is better than no care at all 218. However, an increase in mortality rates would 
indicate that the health of the refugees was deteriorating in regards to certain conditions.  
Some of the difficulties that arise from comparing health statuses of the refugees 
of 1948 and the refugees of 1967 is the difference in focus for UNRWA and WHO at the 
beginnings of the refugee’s exodus. During 1950-1953, UNRWA and WHO were mostly 
concerned with eradicating instances of infectious diseases like typhoid and malaria. By 
1967, infectious diseases were largely under control, and focus shifted to the control and 
treatment of chronic conditions. Even then, it’s still possible to compare changes in 
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healthcare utilization and morbidity for the treatment of the most common communicable 
disease in both 1948 and 1967, tuberculosis219.  Another indicator of healthcare capacity 
is the resources provided to expecting mothers, child mortality rates and access to 
gynecological services.  
To show that the changes in healthcare access following 1967 created adverse 
health outcomes, incidence rates, morbidity rates, and infant mortality rates were used. 
Healthcare capacity was defined as a number of beds reserved by UNRWA for use by 
Palestinian refugees in Jordanian public hospitals220. This is a useful indicator of 
healthcare capacity since UNRWA has to pay for the services of each patient. The years 
compared were 1951 (UNRWA’s first active year) through 1954 and 1967-1970.  
Table 1. Tuberculosis Incidence, Mortality, and Dedicated Beds221 
Year Incidence (Jordan) Mortality (per 1000 
people) 
Dedicated Beds 
1951-1952 4,529 23 25 
1952-1953 1,159* 16* 27 
1953-1954 956* 17 26 
1967-1968 360 17 35* 
1968-1969 300 20* 21* 
1969-1970 273 24* 15* 
*marks significance, alpha = 0.05 
The significances marked by the WHO show a significant decrease in incidence 
and mortality rate. This is a sign that the healthcare services provided to refugees are 
efficient enough to notably reduce the burden of disease. The WHO noted that the short 
rise in tuberculosis incidence noted in 1967 was due to the influx of 300,000 refugees and 
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the subsequent cramped living quarters. But even after the exodus occurred, there were 
no significant decreases in incidence from 1969-1970222.  
A simple regression analysis shows that there is a significant correlation between 
the number of dedicated hospital beds to UNRWA patients and the mortality rate of 
tuberculosis (p=0.044; r2=0.924). A dedicated bed is signatory of all the inpatient services 
a refugee might have gained in the hospital, including physician monitoring and access to 
medications. A decrease in a bed is a loss of acute healthcare services for hundreds of 
refugees per lost bed.   
Interestingly, there were significant decreases in the number of dedicated beds 
within hospitals for the treatment of tuberculosis, due to higher cost of care implemented 
by the Ministry of Health in 1968223. The mortality rate increased, a sign that more 
Palestinian refugees were dying from tuberculosis as a result of this shortage224.  
Table 2. Infant Mortality, Dedicated Gynecological Beds225 
Year Mortality (per 1000 
people) 
Dedicated Beds 
1951-1952 97 100 
1952-1953 82* 125* 
1953-1954 82 125 
1967-1968 74 202 
1968-1969 85* 172* 
1969-1970 80* 160* 
*marks significance alpha = 0.05  
Infant mortality rate, defined as the number of deaths occurring in the first year of 
life per 1000 births, was analyzed by WHO in a similar fashion. As noted in Table 2 
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above, the years 1952 – 1953 showed a significant drop in infant mortality rate, caused 
by the implementation of UNRWA’s health programs. The infant mortality rate in 1968-
1969 rose again in comparison to 1967-1968, alongside a significant decrease in the 
number of beds dedicated to maternity services in those same years226.  
 The linear regression analysis performed on infant mortality rate and dedicated 
beds also showed a significant correlation between dedicated beds and infant mortality 
(p=0.048, r2=.896). The infant mortality rate is an indication for maternal health since the 
health of a mother and child are so highly inter-correlated.  
 Though UNRWA’s health services consist of a multi-faceted approach involving 
health education and nutrition, hospital beds and mortality are a useful indicators of the 
health of a population. These metrics can help understand healthcare access (dedicated 
beds) and its relationship to health outcomes (prevalence and mortality).  
 The distribution of beds is directly determined by the policies put in place by the 
Ministry of Health to limit healthcare services to refugees. By restricting access to 
inpatient hospital services through policy and economic limitations, these Jordanian 
bureaucracies are immediately affect the health and well-being of Palestinian refugees. 
The worsening of metrics such as mortality are a somber example of the effects of the 
denial of care.  
Black September and a Precedent for Exclusion:   
The exclusive policies implemented following the six-day-war barred Palestinian 
refugees from 1967 (and many from 1958) from integrating into Jordanian society. 
Unable to work or live outside the camps, and lacking services such as secondary 
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education and important healthcare resources, leaves Palestinian refugees in Jordan 
vulnerable to this day.  
The use of citizenship as a grounds for human rights abuses sets a dangerous 
precedent for how refugees are treated in Jordan. Furthermore, by the implementation of 
purposely vague laws to Jordan’s bureaucracies, both the King and ministry possess an 
inordinate amount of power to continually restrict these policies based on the political 
climate at the time.  
Black September was the culmination of two decades’ worth of tension between 
the native Jordanians and Palestinians. The civil war between a Palestinian resistance 
organized by the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) and the Jordanian 
government solidified King Hussein’s fear that Palestinian nationalism was a true 
political threat227. 
Prior to the war, the Jordanian police had completely lost control in areas with 
high populations of Jordanians of Palestinian origin228. Negotiations between King 
Hussein and leaders of the PLO failed to solidify King Hussein’s authority, and the 
Jordanian army conducted attacks on PLO military bases, and the armed clashes erupted 
into a civil war that lasted between September of 1970 to July of 1971229. At this time, 
King Hussein gained more military support from the United States in the form of radar 
detection and military training – he had successfully proven to the United States that the 
PLO was a threat to his regime. The complacency the United States possessed regarding 
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Palestinian self-determination had morphed into a concern that Palestinian self – 
determination would threaten the stability of the entire Middle East.  
A perfect example of the political climate’s affect on refugee services is the 
complete restriction of healthcare services to Palestinian refugees following Black 
September. Riding the wave of anti-Palestinian sentiment in Jordan, the ministry of 
interior began revoking Jordanians of Palestinian origin of their citizenship, seemingly at 
random230. No longer refugees or Jordanians, these Jordanians of Palestinian origin lost 
any semblance of support from either Jordan or UNRWA.  The Human Rights Watch 
estimates that more than 40,000 Jordanians of Palestinian origin lost their citizenship in 
this process from 1971 to this day231. Similarly, the Ministry of Health barred Palestinian 
refugees from utilizing beds in Jordanian public hospitals, severely limiting UNRWA’s 
healthcare utilization232. UNRWA lost approximately 200 of its dedicated beds. The loss 
of beds contributed to a spike of more than 700 cases of untreated tuberculosis that could 
not be treated.  
UNRWA’s resources could not handle the cut, and in 1972 the Commissioner – 
General urged the international community to incentivize Jordan to reopen its 
infrastructure to UNRWA through donations. However, the disengagement of the 
international community from responsibility regarding Palestinian refugees is much more 
indicative of how refugee groups will continue to be treated in Jordan. Since 1967, the 
international community has consistently valued regional security over the safety and 
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health of the Palestinians233.  What this means is that while Jordan is increasingly 
susceptible to the whims and interests of actors like the United States, the lack of 
international support limits the bargaining power of UNRWA. 
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Exclusion and the Syrian Refugee Crisis 
The Syrian Refugee Crisis began with the Arab Spring in 2011. Inspired by the 
political revolutions in Tunisia and Egypt, thousands of Syrians took to the streets to 
protest the Assad regime’s restrictions on political freedom. The Syrian government 
reacted quickly and brutally, killing protesters en masse. The result was an escalation into 
a multi-faceted civil war that tore Syria apart, and that rages on to this day. So far, more 
than 4.5 million refugees have fled to neighboring countries like Turkey, Lebanon and 
Jordan. The United Nations High Commission on Refugees (UNHCR) estimates that 13.5 
million remain internally displaced and in need of humanitarian assistance234.  
 As of December 2015, the UNHCR estimates that there are more than 1.4 million 
refugees throughout Jordan. Of these, approximately 700,000 refugees are registered with 
the UNHCR235. Much like the Palestinians, Jordanian policies regarding the Syrian 
refugee crisis are responses to a combination of Jordan’s internal political environment 
and international pressure.  But even pressure from the United States is not enough to 
compel the Jordanian state to risk its own security as the Middle East grows more 
unstable with each passing month.  Continuing from 2011 to 2016, we see Jordanian 
policies transform from inclusive to exclusive, mirroring the same restrictions the 
Palestinian refugees have suffered from in the shift to exclusivity following 1967.  
 However, there are several differences between the resources and organizations 
available to the Syrian population and those afforded to Palestinians. The Syrian refugees 
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fall under the 1951 Geneva Convention on the Status of the Refugee, unlike the 
Palestinians, who were purposefully excluded. Syrian refugee’s inclusion in the mandate 
changes both the number and type of organizations that aid Syrian refugees, numerous 
United Nations organizations and non-governmental organizations. Unlike the Palestinian 
refugees, whose only source of aid and relief is UNRWA, the Syrian refugees has led to 
an influx of numerous non-governmental organizations as well as international – 
governmental organizations that have come to their aid. Notable NGOs include Medecins 
Sans Frontieres (MSF), Save the Children, and the International Rescue Committee. 
United Nations Agencies actively serving Syrians in Jordan include UNICEF, the United 
Nations Children Emergency Fund, the World Health Organization, and most 
importantly, the UNHCR.  
 In 2011, there was a sense of emergency surrounding the Syrian refugees due to 
the escalation in violence following the Arab spring, but it was always thought of as 
temporary. Following the success of Tunisia and Egypt in the Arab Spring, a statement 
by Barak Obama showed that the United States expected the Assad regime to fall “within 
weeks”236. The few thousand refugees that fled in 2011 were the upper-class, Syrians that 
had gained from Assad’s regime and now sought political protection in Jordan237.  
Under the 1951 Geneva Convention, the Syrian’s right to return to their land is 
protected, and even as the refugee crisis continues Syrian refugees hold out hope that 
they will one day return home238. Once the violence ends, there will be no infiltration law 
to keep Syrians from returning to what’s left of their homeland. But compared to the aid 
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given to the Palestinian refugees in 1948 and 1967, the relief services conducted by 
UNHCR seems disorganized and short-sighted. This refugee crisis was supposed to be 
temporary, and the infrastructure of camps, aid, and services was designed as such. No 
one could have predicted the escalation in the Syrian refugee crisis, which has now 
surpassed World War II as the “worst humanitarian crisis of our time”239.  
While the transition from inclusive policies to exclusive policies exists for both 
Syrians and Palestinian refugees, the baselines for these shifts occurred on different 
levels of exclusivity. By the time the Syrian refugee crisis began in 2011, Jordan’s strict 
citizenship policies had been in place for forty-two years. Integration and Jordanian 
citizenship were never an option for Syrian refugees the way they were for Palestinians in 
1948. Those same citizenship laws have barred Syrians from working legally, and 
attending Jordanian schools240. While a few of the refugees that fled with monetary 
means could afford the high residency fees the Jordanian Ministry of Interior charges 
could live as “guests”, and not refugees, the majority of Syrian refugees are reliant on the 
numerous agencies for access to food, water, and shelter.  
The Syrians who began to flood into the camps of 2012 entered a chaotic system 
where numerous actors were at play. At the forefront, the UNHCR is responsible for 
providing shelter and coordinating the services offered from both IGOs, NGOs, and the 
Jordanian government to refugees. A new Jordanian agency, Ministry of Planning and 
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International Cooperation (MoPIC) which was founded in 2011, is the liaison between 
the Ministries of Interior, Health, and the IGOS and NGOS active in Jordan241.  
A large part of the disorganization can easily be attributed to the misalignment of 
goals between the UNHCR and the Jordanian state.  The various bureaucracies of the 
Jordanian State are agents of King Abdullah II’s will, and like his predecessors, is 
ultimately concerned with the security of his rule, especially watching Arab leaders fall 
one by one in the Arab Spring242. Another attributing factor to the chaotic assistance 
offered to refugees is the exponential influx of refugees in the period 2012 – 2015. In 
2012 alone, more than 3,000 refugees would arrive at ten official crossing points per day, 
and countless more snuck in through the 25 unofficial crossing points243. This was a far 
greater influx than the UNHCR expected, and time was spent scrambling to provide 
resources to a population growing at a rate far exceeding Jordan’s capacity.  
The refugees were arriving at a rate exceeding the infrastructure of the existing 
refugee camps. Because of this, the UNHCR obtained special permission from the 
Ministry of Interior for refugees to live outside of refugee camps244. Immediately, a 
dichotomy was created between the services allowed refugees in the urban environment 
and refugees within the camps. Refugees within the camps had access to food, water, and 
shelter that was provided by the UNHCR and the World Food Program. Refugees within 
in the urban environment, when registered, could access resources of NGOS within cities 
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like Amman and Mafraq, but could not access food within the camps without registering 
to live there.  
Movement was not yet restricted, so camp refugees could register and receive 
food and water while moving in and outside of the camp. Urban refugees lived in 
apartments for however long they can afford them, but within a short period of time 
homeless Syrians began occupying tents and zinc oxide shanties on the outskirts of major 
cities, without the benefits that were offered within the UNHCR’s centralized distribution 
system245.  
When Palestinians arrived in the first months of 1948, they were initially met with 
native Jordanians who sympathized with their plight. The incoming Syrians experienced 
a similar initial experience. Faced with both internal pressure to provide for their Arab 
“brothers and sisters” as well as a push from the international community to keep its 
borders open, the Jordanian government pursued a relatively “inclusive” policy in 2011-
2012246. Though refugees could not work, or gain an education at Jordanian schools, the 
UNHCR contracted with the MoH and the MoPIC to allow Syrians to use Jordan’s public 
hospitals for “free” - given sufficient donations from the UNHCR247.  
However, as history has proven with the Palestinian refugees, the native 
Jordanian’s sense of good-will only lasted so long. By the beginning of 2013, Jordan’s 
public opinion had shifted in the opposite direction; the “refugees are a burden”, “they 
are increasing our wait times at hospitals” and they are “making it more difficult for me 
to find work”. Protests erupted in the streets throughout 2013 and 2014 against King 
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Abdullah’s inability to provide for his citizens, or control rising prices of food and gas. 
Each economic blow to the average Jordanian was another protester in a rally expressing 
anger and discontent248. “The potential seeds of conflict are really there,” says Musa 
Shteiwi, who heads the University of Jordan’s Centre for Strategic Studies. A poll he ran 
in 2015 found that 73% of respondents were against hosting more refugees—up from 
64% in 2012249. 
The United States had a vested interest in the security of Jordan’s borders. In 
2012, Al-Nusra, an affiliate of Al-Qaeda, began gaining power along the Syrian – 
Jordanian border, and both King Abdullah II and the United States faced concerns due to 
the large amount of Syrian refugees that traveled between Jordan and Syria to fight250. 
The United States gave $1,135,289,839 in aid to Jordan, of which $303,650,000 was 
specifically for strengthening the Jordanian military, and $18,354,815 for “Anti-
Terrorism”. It is unclear from the literature or expenditures what the aid for “Anti-
Terrorism” is being used for251. The United States also contributed $131 million to the 
UNHCR, requiring it be used to create tighter security measures. These new security 
measures included retina scans that are used to register refugees and track their locations 
using bio-metric identifiers252. The United States push for greater security did not stop 
refugees from entering Jordan, but it did increase monitoring of the movements of Syrian 
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refugees. By January 2014, Iris Scanners were implemented in the use of refugee 
registration.  
The United State’s vested security interests in Jordan have only increased since 
2014, due to the rise of the Islamic State of Iraq & the Levant (ISIL).  became a powerful, 
terrifying force, and quickly usurped the role as the predominant security concern. ISIL, 
or “Daesh” as they are known throughout the Arab world, have caused mass and 
indiscriminate suffering throughout Syria and Iraq.  
 Until February of 2015, the Jordanian state attempted as much disengagement 
from Syria’s war as possible. At the United States’ behest,  Jordan joined a military 
coalition which began air-strikes on Syria to combat ISIL. This political move was 
strongly opposed by the Jordanian populace, who considered the war on ISIL “Syrias 
War- not Jordan’s”253. The  kidnapping and execution of Moath Al-Kasbeh, a Jordanian 
pilot from a prominent Southern family incited Jordanian anger and fear, proving to many 
Jordanians that Jordan should have never gotten involved with the conflict in Syria. ISIL 
was outside Jordanian responsibility254. Fear of conflict spillover as well as the economic 
pressures the average Jordanian now faced inspired a wave of anti-refugee sentiment in 
early 2015 that would push many of these exclusive policies into action.  
Ultimately, the increasing anger of the native Jordanians caused the MoPIC, MoI, 
and MoH to begin barring Syrians from both the urban environment and Jordanian 
services in rapid succession. Like the Palestinian refugee crises preceding it, these 
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exclusive regulations appear most sharply in their affect on the Syrian refugees’ access to 
work and movement, education, and healthcare services.  
Work and Movement 
Um Fadi, a mother of seven children and her sister Um Aaliyah, mother of six, are 
a typical example of the struggles refugees face daily. Now living outside of Zaatari 
camp, their families fled from a village near Homs together in February of 2013. Their 
other sister, Miriam, and her husband, died in a bombing of Homs, leaving their eight 
children orphans. While their husbands are relatively well educated, both of them were 
arrested in May of 2015 for working in the city of Mafraq without a residency permit. 
Um Fadi and Um Aaliyah are now responsible for feeding twenty-three children, the 
youngest of which is four months old. The two matriarchs were able to survive for a few 
months by sheparding goats and selling their milk and cheese, but eventually this was not 
enough to feed twenty –five children, and as winter approached, they surrendered 
themselves to living in the camps in October 2015255.  
While Syrian refugees could live outside the refugee camps in the beginning of 
the Syrian refugee crisis, citizenship policies already in place prevented Syrians from 
working legally. Banned from working, Syrians spent the first few years of the refugee 
crisis working in black market jobs, typically only making one Jordanian Dinar a day, 
which isn’t enough to buy a liter of water.  If caught with illegal workers, Jordanian 
employers risk a fine or being taken to court but with Syrians — many of whom were 
professionals back home and who accept longer hours and half the pay of Jordanians — 
the benefits to business owners easily outweigh the costs. From 2012-2013, the inside of 
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the refugee camps had a thriving smuggling sector, from sneaking in cigarettes to cell 
phones.  
The Jordanian black market also thrives on the sexual abuse of women and young 
girls. Some women refugees are highly vulnerable to exploitation by pimps or traffickers, 
particularly since a significant number fled without their husbands – sometimes with their 
children – and have little or no source of income. Women forced into prostitution or a 
bought marriage are ostracized and blamed for their situation outright – and many men in 
the refugee camps believe women engage in their own sexual slavery due to 
promiscuity256.   The sexual exploitation of women in refugee camps has led the UNHCR 
to create a full time “Sexual and Gender Based Violence” committee in each camp in late 
2013257. The Head of Security of the Zaatari camp stated in 2015 that he saw no evidence 
of prostitution taking place258.  
Jordan’s unemployment skyrocketed to 25% in 2013 from 12% in 2014, making 
even illegal jobs an important commodity amongst native Jordanians. "It's very difficult 
for the government to start issuing Syrians work permits when lots of Jordanians don't 
have a job. So for now there aren't many other options other than to just to look the other 
way” says Timothy Hartman, youth coordinator at the UNHCR259. In 2014, Jordan began 
tamping down on illegal work in Jordan, arresting Syrians who worked without a work 
permit and detaining them in “Cyber City”, a recreational - facility – turned detention 
center in the city of Ramtha.  
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Syrians were able to live in Jordanian cities until October 2014, after which a 
regulation by the MoI corralled every Syrian refugee into three UNHCR camps, Zaatari, 
Azraq, and the Cyber City Detention Center. A statement of the regulation released by 
the Ministry of Interior states that the movement of refugees from the urban environment 
to the camps was to decrease the elevated crime rates in cities260. Since then, it has been 
illegal for Syrian refugees to live outside of the three refugee camps, and a Syrian caught 
“outside” is transported to a prison inside the camp261. An exception to this rule are 
Syrian refugees with Jordanian relatives who can “sponsor” them out of the camps, or, in 
the exceptionally rare cases, have resettled in a Western country262. Depending on the 
case, Syrians in Ramtha are refouled – deported back to Syria against their will263. 
Otherwise, registration to the UNHCR camp is the same as committing yourself to a life 
without a real home or future264.  
The restrictions on freedom of movement are worse than the Palestinian refugees, 
even of 1967, had ever experienced. It has created a culture of anxiety and fear both in 
the camps and the urban environment. This is especially true for undocumented Syrian 
refugees, who are constant risk of imprisonment or refoulment. Unlike the refugees in the 
camps, undocumented refugees lack any basic resources the UNHCR can give – food, 
water, and shelter265. Despite that, more than half of Syrian refugees in Jordan choose 
sneak into Jordan illegally than head to the camps266. By remaining undocumented, these 
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refugees can move from city to city in search of work, or can try to flee the Middle East 
altogether, and head to Europe if they procure enough funds. This freedom is prized by 
many undocumented Syrian refugees, some of which would “rather stay in Syria than live 
in a prison [the refugee camps]”. Many documented refugees have also chosen to sneak 
out of the camps for the same reason, risking all of their savings and their lives to be 
smuggled out by a bailer, Jordanians who have made a career out of smuggling refugees 
in an out of the camps267. 
Education  
Ali is an eighteen-year-old boy from the Sab’ Abar, a small city in the Homs 
governate of Syria. He is the oldest of five siblings. After his parents were killed in Syria 
by Bashar Al-Assad’s forces, he and his siblings fled to Jordan with another family. In 
2011, Ali had been accepted to study at University of Freiburg (Germany) as an engineer. 
He postponed his studies in order to be with his family during the war, and once he and 
his siblings fled, knew he had to stay in Jordan and take care of his siblings. Though his 
siblings never left Zaatari camp, he would sneak out to work as a car mechanic in order to 
provide for his siblings, saying that this is  “closest thing to an engineer I will probably 
become”268.  
 Over 55% of the registered Syrian refugees are under the age of 18269. Prior to the 
refugee crisis, Syria’s public education was one of the best in the Arab world. Syria’s 
universities were the oldest in the Arab world, and were a testament to the old 
advancements of Arab history and culture. Syria had the only medical school where 
medical education and other science programs were taught completely  in Arabic, not 
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English, as a way of honoring the medical and scientific advancements of Islam’s golden 
age 270. Syrian children are bright, ambitious, and eager for opportunity.  
 It is incredibly important that any refugee group is given access to consistent, 
quality education within its host nation. Along a similarly exclusionist vein, Syrian 
children are unable to access the Jordanian public school system unless their parents can 
pay the residency fees271. Syrian university students are unable to enroll in Jordanian 
universities without residency permits as well as “proof of enrollment” from their old 
universities272, a form of documentation most Syrian refugees don’t have.   
 UN agencies as well as several NGOs have coordinated educational services for 
children within the camps. UNICEF runs informal education programs within the camps 
that closely model Syria’s educational framework: in this way, should Syrians ever return 
home, they can continue their education with a similar curriculum273. There are 
approximately 6 informal schools in Zaatari, a camp spanning an eight - mile radius in 
which there is absolutely no transportation for refugees other than their feet (and maybe a 
bike).  
 Despite the United Nations efforts, UNHCR and UNICEF face challenges in 
engaging students (and their families) into attendance. Safety is a large concern for 
students attending informal schools. The 2015 Educational Needs Assessment survey 
conducted by the UNHCR and UNICEF amongst 24,000 students in Zaatari camp shows 
that more than 92% of students have faced verbal, physical, and sexual harassment on 
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their walk to school274. Bullying from other students (39%), and long distances to the 
education center (67%) are other significant reasons students do not attend school. 
Students in higher age brackets (Grades 7-12) cite the need to work as the most important 
reason forgo attendance.  
 These issues preventing attendance are exacerbated amongst the girls of Zaatari. 
There is a disproportionate number of young girls in Zaatari who do not attend school. 
While the UNHCR estimates that 73% of male students from grades 1-6 have at least 
registered for school at one point (though attendance is another matter entirely) only 42% 
of female students were even registered to attend classes by their parents275. Furthermore 
8% of young girls aged 5-18 had never received any sort of education, compared to 6% 
of males. Many young girls were uneager to start school believing they “would not be 
able to learn”.  
 Even once children decide to attend school, UNICEF and other NGOs struggle to 
retain students. The most common reason for boys aged 6-11 for dropping out of school 
was “that the school was too far away (54%). Overcrowding (25%) and the class shifts at 
inappropriate times (14%) were also important factors.  Young girls aged 6-11 also cited 
distance from the school as the main factor for dropping out, but at a much higher rate 
than their male counterparts (71%). Bullying and harassment was subsequently the 
second most common reason young girls dropped out (63%)276. It is estimated that the 
age bracket 30% of children have not attended school (either formal or informal) in more 
than two years.   
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 The pervasive mood in the camp is boredom. Without access to consistent 
education, either because of distance or safety, refugees spend their days only attempting 
to survive. Youth centers created by UNHCR face the same problems that informal 
schools see – distance and safety.  Boys and girls in the age 12-17 bracket are the least 
likely demographic to continue their education in the camps, though they are most likely 
to have already had some degree of formal education in Syria. This age bracket cites the 
“need to work” and “take care of their family” (82%) as two most important reasons for 
avoiding school and similar minded youth groups. In this bracket, the UNHCR estimates 
that approximately 42% of men and 51% of females in this age bracket have not attended 
school at all since arriving in Jordan. Once the Syrians actually return to their homes, the 
majority of them will be years behind in their education.  
 Without the UNHCR and UNICEF, the educational prospects of Syrian children 
would have been much, much worse. But to say that informal education is enough for 
these children is a denial of their right to education. Despite the barriers that prevent them 
from accessing education, these children desperately want to attend school, want to 
succeed, and want to support their families and friends. To prevent them from doing so 
because of restrictive policies or through factors like distance is a disservice to them, and 
an intellectual loss for us.  
Healthcare 
Mohamad Al-Kasaas is a forty – two-year-old husband and father of three, from 
the city of Homs in northern Syria.  While a businessman in Syria, he struggled to pay for 
medications – for hypertension and diabetes – during the first two years of the Syrian 
conflict. While he originally intended to stay in Syria for the duration of the conflict, in 
February of 2014, his apartment complex was bombed, killing one of his children and 
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leaving his four-year-old daughter life-threateningly injured. With his wife and remaining 
child, he carried his daughter, Leena, 280 miles to the Jordanian – Syrian border. The 
journey took more than a month; the family had to stop constantly to preserve their 
strength and attempt to stabilize Leena’s injuries.   
By the time they reached Jordan, Leena’s leg was covered in necrotic (dying) 
tissue. Mohamad himself was in incredibly poor health, not having taken any beta-
blockers in months for hypertension, his blood sugar dangerously low after forgoing food 
so Leena and his other surviving child, Rami, could eat. Leena’s leg was amputated 
above the knee – it had been past the point of saving for weeks. Shortly after arriving, 
Mohamad fell into hypoglycemic shock and needed to be hospitalized for three days.  In 
July of 2015,  Mohamad was unable to get a prescription for his specific formula of beta 
– blockers (which treated his hypertension), after it was removed from the updated 
“essential medications list” approved by the World Health Organization. Mohamad – Al 
Kasaas died of a heart attack in Al-Zaatari camp on September 24, 2015277.  
The story of Mohamad Al-Kasaas is heartbreakingly typical for a Syrian refugee. 
In both the camps and the urban environment, Syrians are unable to access essential 
healthcare services that they need to keep them alive. For every treatment of chronic 
illness like Mohamad’s hypertension, or a traumatic procedure like the amputation of 
Leena’s legs, there are hundreds more that go without care because of Jordanian health 
policies.  
Exclusionist healthcare policies began in 1967, when Palestinian refugees began 
to be banned from public Jordanian high schools. From 2011-2014, international pressure 
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from the United States and the United Nations kept Jordanian public hospitals open. A 
blanket donation from the UN was used to cover the Syrians healthcare costs, to that 
registered Syrian refugees could use their healthcare services for free. However, 
undocumented refugees could never use any of these healthcare services, much like 
refouled Jordanians of Palestinian origin had no access to clinics or hospitals. This 
population is incredibly vulnerable and subject to the worst morbidities. Without 
medications for their chronic illnesses, these diseases lead to life threatening 
exacerbations.  
While emergency cases where handled by third party NGOS along the Syrian 
border, such as Medecins Sans Frontieres, Caritas, and the International Rescue 
Committee, Jordanian public hospitals treated Syrians for their chronic illnesses. Syrians 
poured into Jordan’s hospital systems by the hundreds of thousands, overflowed Jordan’s 
weak healthcare infrastructure, and increased the wait times for Jordanians to receive 
their care by approximately 6 hours278. In an expected move intended to garner Jordanian 
support, the Ministry of Health removed hospital privileges for registered Syrian refugees 
in December of 2015279. UNHCR’s reliance on Jordanian public hospitals left its own 
healthcare services underdeveloped, and only a few NGOs were left to provide healthcare 
to more than 600,000 refugees. Unlike UNRWA, who’s clinical system is organized and 
completely in-house, the UNHCR was unprepared for the public hospitals to retract their 
services.  
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With the advent of public health, epidemiological studies and more advanced 
surveying techniques, the UNHCR and WHO have amassed massive amounts of 
healthcare data.   
The retraction of healthcare services from the Syrians has created an enormous 
gap between primary and secondary care. Doctors from Caritas can easily identify that a 
patient with coronary artery disease needs an angiogram, but there is no way for that 
refugee to get the angiogram done without Jordanian public hospitals. Similarly, diseases 
that indiscriminately befall the world – such as cancer, have no ways to be treated 
without access to chemotherapy and radiation280.  
However, in any situation where hundreds of thousands of people are crammed 
into a tiny space, infectious and communicable diseases are large concerns; a fact 
unchanged since the Palestinian refugee crisis of 1948.  Tuberculosis, Hepatitis A, and 
Polio are the three most significant communicable diseases requiring medical attention281.  
Of these three, tuberculosis composed more than 64% of all communicable disease 
diagnoses, followed by diarrhea and urinary tract infections. Alarmingly, polio, a disease 
which had been eradicated in Jordan since the 1980s, has seen a recurrence amongst 
Syrian refugees, with 24 cases diagnosed since 2013282.  
Disease prevalence for heart disease and diabetes are similar to the Jordanian 
population283.  A health access survey conducted by the UNHCR in 2014 showed that 
hypertension prevalence was the highest, followed by diabetes, chronic respiratory 
diseases, arthritis, and other cardiovascular diseases. 26% of the survey takers stated they 
                                                   
280 UNHCR Health Needs Assessment January 2015.  
281 UNHCR Health Needs Assessment January 2015. 
282 UNHCR Health Access Survey, March 2014.  
283 UNHCR Health Access Survey, March 2014. 
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did not receive care for their illnesses. A follow-up survey conducted in 2015 showed 
that while the disease prevalence remained the same, 64% of these refugees could not 
gain treatment for their conditions, a significant (p < 0.002) increase from 2014284.  
While it is too early to determine how severely the denial of healthcare will affect 
morbidity and mortality, it is clear that the retraction of healthcare services from the 
Syrians has created an enormous gap between primary and secondary care. Doctors from 
Caritas can easily identify that a patient with coronary artery disease needs an angiogram, 
but there is no way for that refugee to get the angiogram done without Jordanian public 
hospitals. Similarly, diseases that indiscriminately befall the world – such as cancer, have 
no ways to be treated without access to chemotherapy and radiation.  
Mohamad Al-Kasaas shared with me in an interview that "the health of his family 
is all that matters". Though he was referring to his daughter at the time, his death could 
have been avoided had he had consistent access to medication upon his arrival in Jordan. 
Hypertension, diabetes, arthritis, are all treatable, each of these chronic illnesses that is 
plaguing the Syrian population can easily be managed with a prescription drug regimens 
and lifestyle management. To be unable to provide these services to people who 
desperately need them out of fear, or economic necessity, is a crime against each Syrian 
refugee who needlessly suffers.
                                                   
284 UNHCR Health Access Survey, March 2014. 
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Conclusion 
 In April 2015, Jordan closed its all border crossings and refused to take in any 
more Syrian refugees. King Abdullah II released a statement stating that “the number of 
Syrian refugees had exceeded Jordan’s capacity to respond”. For years, “Jordan has 
carried the brunt of the burden, and we simply cannot continue this way anymore”285. 
Almost one year later, more than 16,000 Syrians have amassed along the border, in the 
midst of the fighting, and unable to get to safety simply because they aren’t allowed in. 
Any refugee that attempts to enter Jordan from April 2015 on will be an illegal refugee; 
and as an illegal refugee, completely denied his or her rights necessary to survival. These 
refugees have no access to food, water, shelter, or healthcare, let alone education or the 
opportunity to work.  The United Nations has urged Jordan to reopen its borders, but the 
Kingdom of Jordan has not budged. It allows members of the UNHCR and MSF to travel 
across the border to provide services, but will not allow Syrians to enter.  
 The history of Jordan’s relationship with refugees is fascinating, due to the 
complexity that arose with beginning with inclusive policies. In 1948, Jordan created a 
“haven for refugees” that followed them well into every wave of Arab refugee, even if 
Jordanians didn’t want to. Lebanon or Syria, who had refused refugees outright, had a 
comparatively simple (if unjust) relationship with refugees. The Jordanian State (and by 
extension, the Hashemite regime) was now tasked with not only maintaining support for 
                                                   
285 Syria conflict: Jordanians 'at boiling point' over refugees - BBC News. (n.d.). Retrieved March 10, 
2016, from http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-35462698  
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its rule not only within Jordan, but in the international community. The refugees, hardly 
their own political actor, where then shunted back and forth as a political object to be 
used for the Hashemites gain, given rights and services when it was convenient, corralled 
into fenced camps when Jordanians no longer wanted their presence.  
 Of course, a large attributor to the complexity surrounding the fate of Palestinian 
refugees is the large standing involvement of the international community. While there is 
a level of blame which should be placed on the other states in the U.N. and western world 
for not protecting a Palestinians “right to return”, the U.N. also should also be 
acknowledged for the services it has provided to Palestinian refugees consistently since 
1948. Without assistance from UNRWA, the lives of the Palestinian refugees would be 
astronomically worse off today.  However, due to the involvement of the international 
community, specifically economically, the interests of the most powerful donors 
overshadow those of the refugees. The United States’ influence on Jordan has even 
surpassed the internal power of the three Jordanian Kings. 
 The use of refugees as political weight has been clear since 1948. The analysis of 
the influences behind King Abdullah I’s policies show that refugee inclusion is little 
more than a product of the King’s own expansionist visions. Palestinian integration was a 
side-effect of the West Bank’s annexation, not a measure of Jordanian goodwill. King 
Abdullah I benefited both economically and socially by offering the Palestinians 
citizenship. With their citizenship, he not only doubled his territory, but gained a sizable 
population of Arabs wealthier and better educated than their East Bank neighbors. 
Whatever the motivations for King Abdullah I’s inclusive (or expansionist policies), 
those policies set the template for a permanent, if mostly uneasy, relationship with 
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refugees. Palestinian or Syrian alike. That short lived period created an expectation that 
Jordan will take on refugees to this day.   
 As soon as the motivations changed, so did refugees access to work, education, 
and healthcare. The treatment of refugees in Jordan is intimately tied to Jordan’s 
economic and sociopolitical climate; for better or worse. This has been true ever since the 
first refugee crisis in 1948, and holds true as Jordan attempts to completely bar any 
further Syrians from entering Jordan. The next wave of Palestinian refugees which 
arrived in 1967, were victims to policies intended to protect the Hashemite reign from 
struggling Jordanians. Whilst refugees of 1948 were offered citizenship and could 
theoretically participate in Jordanian life, refugees of 1967 were never given that chance.  
 Though the Jordanian state may be ruled by heavy handed monarchy, the 
Jordanian population has a surprising level of influence in determining how Palestinians 
are treated. As soon as enough Jordanians voice rise in discontent, whether it be because 
of their own worsening economic standing or wait times at a clinic because of refugee 
overflow, the Jordanian government responds. This is especially true of Jordanian tribal 
leaders, who the Hashemites depend on for their military strength. By the time the 
Palestinian refugees of 1967 arrived at Jordan’s door, they were entering a Jordan 
charged with tension between native Jordanians and Jordanians of Palestinian origin. The 
economic benefits that the annexation should have brought had worn off within a matter 
of months, and was replaced with economic reality of absorbing 750,000 refugees in need 
of shelter, food, and services.  
With rising enmity between Jordanians of Palestinians the setting for exclusionist 
policies was already in place.  Because the Palestinian refugees of 1967 did not bring any 
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of the economic benefits that followed the refugees of 1948, they were not welcomed as 
citizens but as another Nakbe, an economic catastrophe.  By this point, the Hashemite 
regime had placed the need to maintain the security of the crown over the rights of 
Palestinians, whether they be the Palestinians attempting to assimilate or refugees who 
hold out for return.  
 International pressure and participation in Jordan adds another layer of 
complexity to Jordan’s “refugee population”. With the involvement of the international 
community, question of the refugees is not only a threat to Jordan’s economic viability, 
but of the Jordanian State’s own sovereignty. Exclusive Jordanian policies are framed 
within the public opinion of the time, and the security of the Hashemite regime is a key 
motivator in these exclusive decisions. Foreign economic aid to the state of Jordan is 
allocated to building strength rather than hospitals, especially not hospitals that help 
refugees.  
 Here, we see the power of the United States’, not only as Jordan’s main economic 
benefactor but as a hegemonic power. Ever since 1950, the United States has kept the 
Jordanians and Hashemites afloat, whether it be through direct foreign aid or as the 
largest donor to the United Nations, but these gifts come at a price. Jordan, that slim, 
almost insignificant piece of desert, is central to the Arab world, and a region of uneasy 
quiet. It is crucial to the United States that Jordan remain strong and in US control, even 
when Jordanian sovereignty is threatened not only by its loud, violent, unstable 
neighbors, but by its own citizens, native Jordanian and Jordanian of Palestinian origin 
alike.  
  
131 
Jordan was not always a security interest to the United States, and the services 
provided to the Palestinian exodus of 1948 existed in a world of post WWII compassion. 
But today, Palestinian refugees and Syrians suffer in the name of the United States’ 
interests and the Hashemites’ perpetual insecurity. Money that can be spent on healthcare 
is spent on the military. Aid and relief are intended to secure King Hussein’s position as a 
client king, not to provide for stateless.  
The United States has enough sway over Jordan’s Kings; that if the United States 
was truly interested in the refugees’ rights or well – being, the United States could 
persuade Jordan to provide. But the relationship between Jordan and the United States is 
an alliance of convenience. Threats to the security, sovereignty, and autocracy of 
Hashemite rule are threats to United States’ interests. Threats to United States’ security 
interests are threats to Jordan’s economic and political viability.  When Palestinian 
nationalism became a provable threat after Black September, the United States was 
unsurprisingly silent as King Hussein denied Palestinians their rights to healthcare and 
education one by one.  
 What makes Jordan’s relationship with refugees even more complicated are the 
processes through which exclusion is implemented.  Rather than defined in explicit 
policies, a refugee’s access to services was snatched by nebulous ministry regulations 
that could change in a day. The Jordanian state uses clear and restricting definitions of 
citizenship to not only categorize refugees as “the other” but keeps refugees in a limbo of 
statelessness, with no way to create better lives for themselves or their children.  One law, 
Additional Law No. 56, does not refer to refugees a single time, yet that document is the 
backing of countless regulations which denied Palestinians the ability to go to public 
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schools and universities, to receive treatment at a hospital, or even live outside of a 
refugee camp.  
 With each new political insecurity, regulations either through the Ministries of 
Interior, Education, and Health, get more restrictive. By using the treatment of the 
Palestinians as a precedent, Syrians face an even greater dearth of resources and a 
consistent denial of their rights. As of April 2015, even the right to live without fear of 
violence was taken away when Jordan closed its borders.  
 This thesis analyzed the motivations behind Jordan’s exclusionist policies, but 
with more than 1.4 million Syrian and 2.5 million Palestinian refugees in Jordan, there 
need to be solutions that advocate for the refugees’ rights and well-being. The UNHCR 
advocates three permanent solutions for refugees, repatriation, resettlement or integration, 
but without significant action none of these solutions will ever come to fruition. 
International pressure on Jordan to open its doors again is a start, but as analysis has 
shown, still remains secondary to its own economic standing. Economic donations to the 
state of Jordan, while great, will likely do little to stimulate the economy in the face of 
regional instability. The Jordanian military is more likely to see windfalls of donations 
than the average Jordanian. Continued support and funding of United Nations Agencies is 
needed to ensure that refugees are receiving services to keep them alive. International 
pressure should be applied not to just open borders, but lift its restrictive regulations. 
Refugees cannot be stuck in “permanent temporariness”. Where international pressure 
needs to be applied is at the ministry level, so that Syrians and Palestinians can use the 
UN vouchers available to attend schools, to work. Both Syrians and Palestinians deserve 
a  “permanent solution”, that will allow them to rebuild a life worth living.  
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